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INTRODUCTION
The Investment Company Act of 1940, in Section 1, declares the
findings that led to its adoption:
[I]nvestment companies are affected with a national public
interest in that, among other things—
(3) such companies customarily invest and trade in securities
issued by, and may dominate and control or otherwise affect
the policies and management of, companies engaged in busi-
ness in interstate commerce; . .
While this preamble resulted primarily- from observation of the effect
that mutual fund activities had on the normal corporate affairs of the
funds' portfolio companies, its broad language anticipated a de-
velopment that could not have been foreseen. The corporate "take-
over," the involuntary transfer of corporate control, was virtually un-
known prior to 1964.2
 In the years following, it rapidly became a
widely used tool of aggressively managed firms.' A number of pro-
cedural devices, all designed to accomplish a takeover, have de-
veloped in response to the practical needs of the outsider seeking
1 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(a)(3) (1970).
2 See Hamilton, Some Reflections on Cash Tender Offer Legislation, 15 N.Y.L.F.
269 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hamilton]. The most common method of business com-
bination continues to be the voluntarily negotiated merger or acquisition. Of a total of
1,200 significant mergers and acquisitions taking place in 1967, for example, only 86 of
these resulted from takeover situations. Austin and Fishman, The Tender Takeover, 4
Mergers & Acquisitions no. 3 at 4, 18 (1969).
a On March 6, 1969, SEC Chairman Budge testified before a Senate Subcommittee
studying the securities industry that during the previous seven months there had been
54 cash tender offers involving $1.4 billion and 104 exchange offers involving $9 billion of
securities. Hearings on Problems in the Securities Industry Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 13-14
(1969). These numbers have fallen off somewhat in subsequent years due to pressure
on conglomerates from federal legislation and increased administrative activity. Hamilton,
supra note 2, at 270 n.5.
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control (the offeror), and the necessities of the transfer situation.
The principal devices are the cash tender offer, the public exchange
offer and the proxy contest.
A cash tender offer is essentially a public invitation to share-
holders of the company to be taken over (the target company) to
tender their shares to the offeror for purchase at a specified price' In
an exchange offer, the offeror proposes to exchange a package of its
own securities for shares of the target company. The package fre-
quently includes debt securities combined with some kind of equity
position—i.e., common stock, options or warrants to acquire common
stock, or a conversion privilege. 5 A proxy contest involves an attempt
to wrest control from incumbent management through the ownership
or voting control of a sufficient number of shares to enable the outsider
to elect a majority of the board of directors.
This comment will consider the statutory and administrative
measures regulating mutual fund participation in corporate take-
overs. It will also analyze the policy underlying the relevant legisla-
tion and the effectiveness of present rules in implementing that policy.
The succeeding discussion suggests that (1) the present regulatory
emphasis on disclosure does not fully realize the legislative purpose
of protecting the small investor caught in a control contest involving
financial institutions; (2) the SEC should exercise its rule-making
power to provide the needed regulation; and (3) under either the
present or suggested future regulations, funds wishing to participate
in control contests must proceed cautiously if they are to avoid costly
litigation and, possibly, investment losses.
I. REASONS FOR MUTUAL FUND PARTICIPATION IN
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS
While working control of the target company may often be
achieved with a minority stock position, a larger interest is usually
necessary to effect a satisfactory takeover. Ownership in excess of fifty
percent is usually necessary to discourage competing offers and to
consolidate the target company's financial statements with those of
the offeror. The ability to consolidate financial statements is par-
ticularly important where the target company's earnings are sought
to augment the earnings of the offeror.' Furthermore, the use of
target company funds to service or retire the debts of the offeror, in-
cluding those incurred in making the takeover bid, necessitates a
statutory merger. In most states this cannot be accomplished without
4 See generally S. Hayes and R. Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 Harv.
Bus. Rev. Mar.-Apr. 135, (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hayes and Taussigl; Bromberg,
Tender Offers: Safeguards and Restraints, 21 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 613; Hamilton, note
2, supra.
6 Hamilton, supra note 2, at 293.
6 Institutional Investor Study Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2827 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SEC Institu-
tional Investor Study].
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the approval of the stockholders by a two-thirds vote. 7 Finally, eighty
percent ownership of the target company is a prerequisite to filing a
consolidated tax return, which permits use of the target's operating
losses or loss carry-forwards to reduce the offeror's taxable income.°
Quite clearly, the direct purchase by the offeror of sufficient tar-
get shares to assure it of minimal control would require considerable
capital, even where the stock is undervalued. In addition, if an ex-
change offer is contemplated, the offeror must still make substantial
open-market purchases of target company shares preparatory to the
offer in order to assure its success. Thus in most cases it is necessary
for the offeror to seek economically powerful allies who have the
requisite funds available. These may include lending institutions from
whom the offeror may borrow the needed capital or institutional in-
vestors who can provide the necessary financial strength by par-
ticipating directly in the takeover. The assistance of such financial
institutions may also be sought by target company management in an
effort to resist the offeror's bid for control.°
Of the various types of institutional investors, mutual funds are
eminently qualified to participate in a takeover, offensively or defen-
sively. As of December, 1970, the mutual fund industry had total net
assets of approximately $47.6 billion," of which 80.9 percent were
invested in common stocks." At that date, mutual fund assets repre-
sented 7.48 percent of the total market value of all shares listed on
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and mutual fund assets
actually invested in securities listed on the NYSE amounted to 5.31
percent of the total value of all such listed shares." The distribution
of mutual fund assets within the industry reveals the concentration of
this financial power. The total net asset value of the ten largest funds
totaled $16.5 billion in December, 1970, or almost thirty-five percent
of total industry assets; one hundred funds had total assets in excess of
$95.7 million." Furthermore, the ten leading management companies
had assets under management amounting to $26.1 billion, or close to
7 Id.
8 Id. See also Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 381, 382.
0 See e.g., the case studies of power struggles involving Bath Industries, Inc., dis-
cussed in the SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 6, at 2775, and MGM, dis-
cussed in Fortune, May, 1967 at 150, where mutual funds held shares representing the
balance of power and sided with target company management.
10 Investment Company Institute, 1971 Mutual Fund Fact Book 3, 7. This figure
may be compared with total net assets of $17 billion in 1960, $35.2 billion in 1965, and
$52.7 billion in 1968. Id.
11 Id. at 80. This figure has ranged between 79.0% and 86.5% since 1961. Id.
12 Id. at 30.
18 The ten largest mutual funds and their total net assets are as follows: Investors
Mutual Inc., $2,615,700,000; Dreyfus Fund, $2,231,700,000; Investors Stock Fund,
$2,227,100,000; Massachusetts Investors Trust, $1,955,600,000; Affiliated Fund, $1,601,
000,000; Wellington Fund, $1,376,900,000; Investment Company of America, $1,168,100,
000; Massachusetts Investors Growth Stock Fund, $1,164,500,000; United Accumulative
Fund, $1,140,600,000; and Fundamental Investors, $1,054,300,000. Moody's Investors
Services, 1971 Bank and Finance Manual a56.
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fifty-five percent of total industry assets.14
 Thus it is evident that
mutual funds have the financial resources to play a decisive role in
contests for corporate control.
At the 1970 congressional hearings on the Williams Act, a num-
ber of industry representatives testified that mutual funds would never
seek control of portfolio companies for themselves and that they
should, therefore, be exempted from the requirements of that act."
While it may be true that funds do not seek corporate control for
themselves, their ability to influence the result of a control contest
through available investment funds, or by reason of shares already
owned, cannot be ignored. Moreover, there is considerable data in-
dicating that funds have, in fact, exercised this power. For example,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, in its Institutional Investor
Study, examined nine separate corporate takeover attempts involving
significant institutional participation; eight of these involved mutual
fund participation having a critical impact upon the takeover bid."
Mutual fund participation in a takeover bid may occur in either
of two basic situations. The first occurs where a fund is suddenly con-
fronted with a corporate takeover attempt involving a company (either
offeror or target) whose securities are already owned by the fund.
The second occurs where a fund, owning no securities of the com-
panies involved, seeks to participate upon its own initiative or upon
the advice or invitation of others. The variations on these basic situa-
tions are numerous. While it is more likely that a mutual fund would
assist the offeror," there may be situations in which the fund is asked
by the target company to purchase its stock as a defensive tactic."
In some cases, the fund may be approached by a broker who has him-
self selected a target company, but who may not yet have found a
definite offeror.1°
The factors causing funds to participate, and even to seek in-
volvement, with a takeover offeror are many. First, and most obvious,
mere rumors of a suspected takeover can raise the price of the target
company's stock, and cash tender or exchange offers are usually made
at a fifteen to twenty percent premium over the prevailing market
14
 This estimate is based on ownership information for all major mutual funds, and
assets-under-management data for all major management firms as contained in Moody's
1971 Bank and Finance Manual, note 13 supra.
15
 Hearings on S. 336 and S. 3431 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970): Statement of Donald
Calvin, Vice President, New York Stock Exchange, at 101, 102-3; Statement of Richard
Walbert, President, National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., at 110, 111-12; State-
ment of Craig Severance, Chairman, Federal Securities Acts Committee, Investment
Bankers Ass'n, at 114, 116-20.
16 SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 6, at 2775-813.
17 See pp. 1116-18 infra.
18 See note 9, supra. Sales of the offeror's stock may also be solicited by target
company management. SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 6, at 2840-41.
10 See the cases of Reliance Insurance Co. and United Fruit Co., described in SEC
Institutional Investor Study, supra note 6, at 2787, 2793.
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price." Even if the takeover is unsuccessful, the shares may still be
sold at a profit. If there are competing offers and a contest develops,
the price will rise even higher." Such a situation offers the alert mutual
fund manager an opportunity to increase the net asset value of his
fund through trading profits and to improve his own investment
performance. Frequently, his assistance in facilitating the takeover is
the quid pro quo for advance knowledge of the offer. He is expected
to purchase and hold target stock in his portfolio until a public offer
is made and then to tender the shares to the offeror.
Second, the takeover situation may offer the fund manager an op-
portunity to achieve liquidity in a block of portfolio stocks not other-
wise readily marketable. As a mutual fund grows through additional
sales, the size of its investment in each portfolio security must in-
crease if it is to keep the number of different issues it holds within
a manageable range. Increasing institutionalization of the securities
markets frequently makes it impossible for a fund to liquidate a sub-
stantial investment which has soured without incurring a significant
loss; the fund is said to be "locked in." 22 The growth of block trading
techniques—i.e., negotiated trades between institutions which are exe-
cuted by a block brokerage specialist, has helped to alleviate this
situation, but not entirely." The selection by an offeror of this "bad
investment" as a takeover target may go a long way toward helping
a fund out of a difficult situation at a favorable price, and funds have
been known to seek out an offeror for such a target on their own
initiative."
Third, the financial power which a mutual fund can bring to bear
in a contested takeover may result in its receipt of a special price,
opportunity or inducement not available to all target company share-
holders.25
 The fund, for example, may sell its shares to the offeror
upon the stipulation that the fund will receive any higher price later
offered in a public tender.2° The fund may demand the alternative
right to share in any profits made by the offeror upon later disposition
20 See Hayes and Taussig, supra note 4 at 140. See also E. Thomas, Warehousing,
in Practicing Law Institute, Mutual Funds, Corporate Law and Practice Transcript
Series No. 10 at 191 (1969).
21
 Hamilton, supra note 2, at 300-01.
22
 Baum and Stiles, The Silent Partners: Institutional Investors and Corporate Con-
trol 69, 79 (1965). See also A. Smith, The Money Game 216 (1968):
When three funds, each with 100,000 shares to sell, arrive at the opening [of
the New York Stock Exchange] on the same morning, the specialist simply can-
not handle it. He calls a Governor of the Stock Exchange and asks for time to
round up buyers. They "shut the stock down"; it simply ceases trading .. .
For that moment, liquidity has come to a halt . . . . (When the stock does re-
open, it is likely to be a good 20 points lower .. ..)
20 115 IL Pa. L. Rev. 669, 686 (1967) (remarks of W.B. Moses, Vice Chairman,
Massachusetts Investors Trust).
24
 See the case of Home Insurance Co. described in SEC Institutional Investor
Study, supra note 6, at 2778-79.
25 Id. at 2780-81.
20 Id. at 2780.
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of the stock if the takeover is not accomplished.' Where a public ex-
change offer is contemplated, the fund may demand the right to sell
back to the offeror the shares it receives in exchange or to make a
secondary public offering of these shares after the takeover has been
completed.28
 The fund may also be invited to participate in a non-
public offering of the offeror's shares at a favorable price, the pro-
ceeds of which will be used to finance the takeover bid. 29 In some
cases the benefits offered may be directed at the fund manager per-
sonally. He may, for example, be promised the right to manage a por-
tion of the target's portfolio, assuming a successful takeover, in ex-
change for his cooperation S0
II. FUND PARTICIPATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS
A. Restrictions Arising From Investment Policies
Participation by a mutual fund in a contest for corporate control
inevitably requires it to purchase or hold a sizeable block of shares in
a particular company. To the extent that the law prevents a fund
from doing this, its ability to participate is curtailed. Although no
federal legislation deals specifically with the problem of concentration
of mutual fund ownership in portfolio companies, both the Investment
Company Act of 1940 3' and the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 con-
tain provisions which have the effect of limiting such concentration.
The relevant sections of these statutes deal with aspects of a fund's
investment policies and, specifically, with the requirements for (1)
classification as a diversified management company, (2) classification
as a regulated investment company, (3) disclosure of investment
policies, and (4) alteration of fund classification and investment
policies.
Section 5 (b) (1) of the Investment Company Act 82 requires that,
before a fund may be classified as a diversified management company,
seventy-five percent of the fund's total assets must be invested in
cash, cash items or securities. As to this seventy-five percent, the
holdings in any one portfolio company cannot exceed five percent of
total fund assets or ten percent of the portfolio company's outstand-
ing voting securities s3 Approximately ninety-six percent of manage-
ment companies are diversified." This fact is probably due to the
desire of the funds to increase their appeal to the average mutual fund
27 Id. at 2773.
28 See the case of Reliance Insurance Co. Id. at 2787, 2791.
29 See the case of Great American Holding Corp. Id. at 2781, 2782.
80 Id. at 2784.
81 15 U.S.C.H 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1970).
32 15 U.S.C. 80a-5(b) (1) (1970).
33 Id.
34 G. Maseritz, The Investment Company: A Study of Influence and Control in the
Major Industrial Corporations, 11 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1969).
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investor, who seeks not only the advantage of professional investment
management, but also a diversification of investment not obtainable
by a small investor on an individual basis.
Since Section 13 (a) (1) of the Investment Company Act pro-
hibits a fund from changing its Section 5 classification without a ma-
jority vote of its shareholders,'" classification requirements might be
expected to have some effect in restricting a fund's investment in port-
folio companies involved in control contests. The mechanics involved
in obtaining shareholder approval make it unlikely that a favorable
vote could be obtained in time to participate in a particular takeover
bid if no action were taken until the opportunity for participation
became known to the fund. Nevertheless, a number of factors limit
the effectiveness of the classification provision: (1) a diversified com-
pany does not lose its status if an investment which represented five
percent or less of the fund's assets at the time of purchase subsequently
appreciates in value and rises above the five percent limit; se (2) the
limit applies only to individual funds and has no limiting effect on the
total holdings of a multi-fund organization managed by a single in-
vestment adviser; (3) twenty-five percent of a fund's assets are un-
restricted as to concentration; 87 and (4) a vote of the shareholders
in favor of changing a fund's classification to nondiversified is not
difficult to obtain as long as the fund is performing well and sufficient
time is available to accomplish the change.
Probably because an unauthorized change in classification would
be a clear violation of the statute, there is no reported case involving
a direct attempt by management to change its classification without
shareholder approval. More commonly, where management has made
an investment that is inconsistent with its classification, such invest-
ment also violates its investment policy as stated in the registration
statement and any resulting suit would arise under Section 8 of the
Investment Company Act.'
In addition to the requirements of the Investment Company Act,
the Internal Revenue Code contains separate standards for deter-
mining whether an investment company is sufficiently diversified to
qualify as a regulated investment company; these standards may also
inhibit fund participation in a takeover bid. The Code requires that
fifty percent of a fund's assets must be invested in cash, cash items or
85 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a) (1970):
No registered investment company shall, unless authorized by the vote of a
majority of its outstanding voting securities—
(1) change its subclassification as defined in section 80a-5(a) (1) and (2)
of this title or its subclassification from a diversified to a nondiversified com-
pany
88 15	 $ 80a-5(c) (1970).
87 Id. at 80a-5(b) (1). This 25% may be considerable, and in the case of the larger
funds, exceeds $250 million. See note 13 supra.
38 See text at pp. 1120-24 infra.
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securities, not exceeding, with respect to any one issuer, five percent
of total fund assets or ten percent of the issuer's voting securities as
This restriction is the same as that imposed upon seventy-five percent
of the assets of funds classified as diversified investment companies
under the Investment Company Act' The Code imposes two further
restrictions: no more than twenty-five percent of fund assets may be
invested in the securities of any one issuer, or of two or more issuers
in the same or related business, which the fund controls;" and no
more than thirty percent of the fund's gross income may be derived
from the disposition of securities held for less than three months."
While the Code standards provide funds with significantly more
flexibility than do those of the Investment Company Act, violation
of the Code standards may be far more costly. Only by meeting the
Code requirements may a mutual fund "pass through" its investment
income to its shareholders and avoid the double taxation to which cor-
porate dividends are subject." Rarely will the potential gain from par-
ticipation in a takeover bid suffice to justify the tax liability incurred
-by a fund through loss of regulated investment company status.
Within the limitations imposed by the Investment Company Act
and the Internal Revenue Code, the degree of flexibility retained by a
mutual fund to concentrate its assets in a particular portfolio com-
pany depends upon the fund's other investment policies. Section 8(b)
of the Investment Company Act requires public disclosure of these
policies." The section provides that the registration statements filed
with the SEC must reveal the fund's investment policies, with regard
to certain enumerated activities, as well as all other investment policies
of the registrant which are changeable only by shareholder vote or
39 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 851(b) (4)(A) (ii) (Subchapter M).
49 See text at note 33 supra.
41 Mt. Rev. Code' of 1954, 11 851(b) (4)(B).
43 Id. § 851(b)(3).
43 Id. 852. "Double taxation" refers to the taxation of general business corporation
dividends at the corporate level and then again as personal income in the hands of the
shareholders.
44 Section 8(b) provides that every registered investment company must file with the
SEC a registration statement containing the following information:
(1) a recital of the policy of the registrant in respect of each of the following
types of activities, such recital consisting in each case of a statement whether
the registrant reserves freedom of action to engage in activities of such type,
and if such freedom of action is reserved, a statement briefly indicating, insofar
as is practicable, the extent to which the registrant intends to engage therein:
(A) the classification and subclassifications as defined in sections 80a-4 and
80a-5 of this title, within which the registrant proposes to operate ..	 (E)
concentrating investments in a particular industry or group of industries ... and
(H) portfolio turn-over .	 ,
(2) a recital of all investment policies of the registrant, not enumerated in
paragraph (1), which are changeable only if authorized by shareholder vote
(3) a recital of all policies of the registrant, not enumerated in paragraphs
(1) and (2), in respect of matters which the registrant deems matters of funda-
mental policy....
15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b) (1970).
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which are considered by the registrant to be fundamental." Section
13 (a) (3) prohibits any deviation from these stated policies without
the approval of a majority of the fund's shareholders." In addition,
each fund is required to transmit semiannual financial statements to
the shareholders, including a list showing the amounts and values of
securities owned, so that the investors might see the practical results
of the stated policies:"
In order to comply with the disclosure requirements and to
sharpen their sales appeal, most funds have established a well-defined
investment policy which is fully explained in the prospectus. Some
funds place primary emphasis on long-term capital appreciation with
current income only a secondary consideration; other funds emphasize
income and stability of capital, or attempt a balance between income
and growth." Some funds specialize in a particular industry, while
a few emphasize investment in a certain geographical area."
The stated investment policies of the so-called "go-go (or per-
formance) funds" are sufficiently broad to include participation in
corporate takeovers, leading to a relatively rapid turnover and profit,
as a permissible activity.' Income funds, growth funds, or balanced
funds, however, might have difficulty justifying participation in such
high-risk ventures in light of their more conservative investment ob-
jectives." Nevertheless, when a fund is faced with falling market
values and redemptions that exceed sales, participation in a take-
over bid may have unusual appeal and the pressure to temporarily
45 Id.
48 15 U.S.C.	 80a-13 (1970):
(a) No investment company shall, unless authorized by the vote of a majority of
its outstanding voting securities-
. . .
(3) deviate from its policy in respect of concentration of investment in any
particular industry or group of industries as recited in its registration statement,
deviate from any investment policy which is changeable only if authorized by
shareholder vote, or deviate from any policy recited in its registration statement
pursuant to section 80a-8(b) (3) of this title ....
47 15 U.S.C.	 80a-29(d)(2) (1970).
48 Investment Company Institute, 1971 Mutual Fund Fact Book 5.
45 Id. at 33.
80 See text at notes 64-66, infra.
51 The risks inherent in such participation arc illustrated by the aftermath of
Armour & Co. v. General Host Corp., 296 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), discussed at
pp. 1138-40 infra. General Host induced a number of mutual funds to purchase Armour
securities for tender to General Host in an exchange offer by which General Host planned
to take over Armour. Although General Host received enough tenders to give it control
over Armour, its interest was not sufficient to effect a statutory merger, mainly because
of a 33% interest acquired by Greyhound Corp. as a result of a competing cash tender
offer. General Host soon became unable to service the debt incurred in the takeover and
was forced to sell its interest to Greyhound. Many of the funds holding General Host
securities as a result of the exchange sold nut, at a considerable loss, within five months
of the end of the tender period; the value of the General Host exchange package declined
from $74.65 at the expiration of the tender period to $30.00 one year later. SEC Institu-
tional Investor Study, supra note 6, at 2806-07.
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alter investment policy without the formalities required by the Invest-
ment Company Act may be substantial.
Aldred Investment Trust v. SECa 2 illustrates the problems that
an unauthorized change in investment policy can produce. The Trust
declared in its registration statement that it was not its policy to in-
vest in companies for the purpose of exercising control. Although
since its formation, antedating the passage of the Investment Com-
pany Act, the Trust had concentrated its investments in public
utility stocks, its stated policy was to achieve greater diversification
while limiting investment in any other single industry to twenty-five
percent of the Trust's total assets. The Trust encountered financial
difficulties, the market value of the trust assets fell to one-third of the
principal amount of its outstanding debentures, and income failed to
meet interest payments. New management was able to purchase voting
control of the Trust at a foreclosure sale of trust shares. The new
managers liquidated thirty percent of the Trust's portfolio, used the
proceeds to purchase majority control of a race track, and proceeded
to elect themselves directors and officers of the race track. A meeting
was held for the purpose of approving the change in investment
policy; however, no mention of the race track was made, and the
nonmanagement interests represented comprised less than one-tenth of
one percent of the voting shares.
The SEC, pursuant to its authority under Section 35 of the In-
vestment Company Act, 58 brought suit against the officers and direc-
tors of the Trust, alleging that the departure from disclosed invest-
ment policies violated Section 13 (a). The court was unimpressed by
the fact that the new investment had not only proved better than
the utility stocks, but had done so well that it had rescued the fund
from its financial difficulties." The court found that management
had been motivated primarily by personal interest and had sought
personal advantages contrary to the interests of the Trust. The meeting
at which shareholders had approved the change in policy was found
to have been a sham. The shareholder communication giving notice
of the meeting was found to be so misleading as to border on false-
hood. The court held that the well-concealed plans of management,
and their subsequent execution, constituted a violation of fiduciary
duty and a gross abuse of trust. The court therefore ordered the
officers and directors' removed from office and affirmed the lower
court appointment of receivers with power to reorganize or liquidate
the Trust.
Although Aldred is a rather extreme example of a change in in-
52 151 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946).
53 Section 35 authorizes the SEC to bring an action in federal district court against
fund officers and directors alleging gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust. The section
provides that if the allegations are proved the court shall enjoin the guilty persons from
continuing to act in such positions of trust. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1970).
54 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep., Fed. Bar Ass'n Conference on Mutual Funds 171 (1966).
1122
MUTUAL FUNDS IN CORPORATE TAKEOVERS
vestment policy, it remains as a warning of potential liability to fund
managers who seek participation in takeover bids where such partici-
pation involves a change in investment policy requiring a stockholder
vote. In a more recent case, Green v. Brown," a stockholder of a
closed-end diversified investment company brought a derivative action
against the fund's directors for permitting investment of more than
twenty percent of the fund's total assets in securities of each of two
corporations, in contravention of investment policies stated in the
registration statement. The statement declared that none of the in-
vestment policies set forth therein could be changed without the ap-
proval of a majority of the shareholders. Among the policies listed
was one indicating that the fund would not invest more than twenty
percent of its total assets in the securities of any one private issuer,
Although the court found that the investment in question violated
the stated policy and was made without shareholder approval, it never-
theless dismissed the complaint. The policy in question, said the court,
was not among those listed in the registration statement as "funda-
mental." Thus it did not come within the prohibitions of Section 13 (a)
of the Investment Company Act, which prohibited deviation, without
shareholder approval, from any fundamental policy recited in the
registration statement." The court was somewhat troubled by this
decision, and expressed that feeling in its opinion." The purpose of
the registration statement, the court indicated, is to provide informa-
tion on policies for the protection of investors. No policy could be more
fundamental to an investment company than its investment policy,
and investors ought to be able to rely on stated policies. Nevertheless,
the language of section 13 (a) plainly compelled the curious result
that a fund may deviate from its stated investment policies with im-
punity as long as it has not labeled these policies "fundamental." The
court concluded that the remedy lay with Congress and not with the
courts.
On appeal," the SEC filed an amicus curiae brief arguing that
55
 276 F. Supp. 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd on other grounds 398 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.
1968).
55
 At the time of the case, § 8(b)(2) required "a recital of the policy of the
registrant in respect of matters . . . which the registrant deems matters of fundamental
policy and elects to treat as such." Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. I, § 8(b)
(2), 54 Stat. 803, as amended 15 U.S.C. 80a-8(b) (2) (1970). Section 13(a) (3) prohibited
deviation "from any fundamental policy recited in [an investment company's] registration
statement pursuant to section 80a-8(b) (2) of this title." Investment Company Act of
1940, ch. 686, tit. I, § 13(a)(3), 54 Stat. 811, as amended 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a)(13)
(1970).
Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 3(d), 84 Stat. 1414-15, as amended 15
U.S.C. § 80a-8(6)(2) (1970), amended § 8(b) (2) to read as it appears in note 44 supra,
and placed the language of the old § 8(b)(2) into § 8(b)(3), note 44 supra. The amend-
ment also added corresponding language in § 13(a)(3) prohibiting deviation "from any
investment policy which is changeable only if authorized by shareholder vote . ."
57
 276 F. Supp. at 756.
55 398 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1968). Soon after the suit was brought, the investments in
question were ratified by the shareholders of the fund, and were subsequently renegotiated
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Congress had intended the term "fundamental" to apply to any in-
vestment policy which the registrant indicates is subject to change only
upon shareholder approval. The SEC admitted, however, that its
printed forms, although in the process of being modified, were in-
consistent with this view." In 1970, Congress settled the problem
by deleting "fundamental" from section 13 (a), thus prohibiting devia-
tion from any investment policy found in the registration statement."
Were it not for this amendment, the result in Green might have meant
considerable freedom for funds to participate in takeover bids, in viola-
tion of stated policies, as long as they had the foresight to refrain
from labeling such policies as fundamental. In light of the amend-
ment, however, the same case would produce the opposite result
today.
On balance, the limitations on mutual funds represented by the
statutory provisions discussed in this section of the comment may
best be viewed as simply a trap for the unwary. To a fund manager
aware of these restrictions and sufficiently farsighted to see the
desirability of participation in future takeover situations, the re-
strictions are more form than substance. Under the limitations on
concentration required of a fund that is a diversified management
company (Investment Company Act) and a regulated investment
company (Internal Revenue Code), it is possible for a fund to invest
up to thirty percent" of its total assets in a single target company
and still be in compliance, even though such investment would give the
fund ownership of more than ten percent of the target. In the case
of most large or medium-size funds, it is possible for funds to enjoy
significant participation in a takeover bid with a commitment con-
siderably below this level.
Notwithstanding the potential liability under the Securities Act
for the dissemination of false information in a prospectus,° 2 the key
to avoiding liability for deviating from a fund's stated investment pol-
icies is a carefully drafted registration statement and prospectus."
so as to come within the 20% limit. Because certain issues were first raised on appeal
and also because of possible mootness, the court remanded the case to the district court
for a full rehearing.
59
 Id. at 1009. The registration forms used by the SEC permitted the defendant to
raise a defense under § 37(c) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. I 80a-37(c) (1970), which applies to
actions taken in good faith and in conformity with any rule, regulation or order of the
Commission.
00 See note 56 supra.
01
 Five percent of the restricted 75% may be invested in the securities of a single
company as well as the unrestricted 25%. See text at note 33 supra.
92 A fund is liable for any omissions or misrepresentations in its registration statement
or prospectus. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12, 15 U.S.C. f§ 77k, 1 (1970). Damages
under these sections are compensatory only and cannot exceed the cost of the security to
the plaintiff plus interest. Id. at §§ li(e), 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 1 (1970).
95 The prospectus is, in effect, an abbreviated reprint of the registration statement on
file with the SEC and is used primarily for sales purposes. Items in the registration state-
ment which are omitted from the prospectus may be obtained from the SEC upon pay-
ment of the fees prescribed by SEC rules.
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The use of broad, liberal language, combined with specified res-
ervations regarding the activities and investment techniques to be
utilized in pursuit of the fund's objectives, should preserve the wide
investment appeal of the fund while leaving the fund's adviser sufficient
flexibility to seek performance through participation in takeover bids.
For example, a prospectus for the Oppenheimer Fund" contains the
following language:
Capital appreciation may be sought through investment in
"special situations" by which is meant a company where some
particular development has occurred or is expected to occur
which, in the opinion of management, may prompt an increase
in the value of the company's securities, regardless of general
business conditions or the movement of the market as a
whole."
A forthcoming takeover bid for a target company would surely
qualify as a development whose occurrence or expected occurrence
creates a special situation that may cause the stock to rise in value. The
quoted language leaves the fund free to participate in such a situation
without fear of violating its investment policies. Other examples of
the use of such language are readily available." It is submitted that,
64
 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc., prospectus dated April 8, 1971.
65
 Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
00
 The following examples are representative:
Management expects to make investments involving greater than average
risks.
To achieve its objectives the Fund may engage in certain speculative invest-
ment techniques.
The Dreyfus Leverage Fund, Inc., prospectus dated January 6, 1971, at 4 (emphasis
added).
The policy of the Fund will be to purchase securities primarily for the pur-
pose of investment and not for the purpose of resale. The Fund, however, pro-
poses to make such changes in its portfolio at such times as in the opinion of its
Board of Directors are necessitated by market, economic or other conditions. .
However, during periods when compliance with the foregoing policies may
not be in the interests of investors, the Management may temporarily invest in
other types of security.
Admiralty Fund, prospectus dated May 4, 1970, at 3 (emphasis added).
In selecting securities based on their appreciation possibilities, investment
decisions generally involve an assessment of the fundamental values of the
securities and consideration of prevailing market conditions. . . . However, the
Fund, consistent with its objectives of capital appreciation may acquire or
dispose of securities on the basis of short, term market considerations.
Ivest Fund, prospectus dated December 15, 1971, at 1 (emphasis added).
The investment objective of the Fund [will be realized through investment]
in the following types of securities:
1. Securities of companies which have been unpopular for some time but where
in management's opinion recent developments such as those listed below suggest
the possibility of improved operating results:
(b) a change in management ..
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by thoughtful planning of investment objectives and careful drafting
of prospectus language, potential liability for funds participating in
corporate takeovers arising from transgression of investment policies
may be minimized.
B. Antifraud, Antimanipulation and Insider Trading
The wide dispersion of ownership in most large public corpora-
tions makes it virtually impossible for an outsider to obtain control
without making some kind of offer to all of the target company share-
holders." Equally important to a potential offeror is the initial acqui-
sition of a substantial block of shares, in order to form a power base
from which to make a bid. At least a portion of this block must be ac-
quired in secrecy, to prevent any increase in price that might follow
public awareness of the impending takeover bid, which would make
acquisition more expensive. Secrecy is also necessary in order to mini-
mize the time available for defensive maneuvers by the target com-
pany.
Purchases by the tender offeror can be effectively supplemented,
and the probability of success thereby enhanced, by enlisting the sup-
port of institutional investors owning or willing to acquire substantial
blocks of target securities. However, in order to insure that the federal
securities laws are not violated in the takeover process, both the
offeror who wishes to obtain institutional assistance, and the mutual
fund manager who is willing or anxious to participate must be aware
of the various legal requirements affecting their relationships and
proceed accordingly. This section of the comment, and the two sec-
tions which follow it, will consider various aspects of this problem.
One of the fundamental objectives of the federal securities laws,
as expressed in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
l934,88 is the protection of investors against fraudulent or manipula-
tive securities transactions. Some of the rules promulgated by the SEC
under this section significantly affect participation by mutual funds in
corporate takeovers. Specific violations may result from fund trans-
actions either before or during a tender offer. They may occur in the
context of either a cash tender offer or a public exchange offer. Funds
may also be held liable for violations in situations where, although
they do not violate the rules directly, they participate in a takeover
bid with one guilty of direct violations.
The most obvious problems in this area arise when a fund manager
has received confidential information about a planned takeover prior
(e) the prospect of an acquisition or merger.
Contrafund, Inc., prospectus dated March 1, 1971, at 1 (emphasis added).
07 Institutional Investor Study Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2833 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SEC Institu-
tional Investor Study].
88 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); see also Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a) (1970).
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to public announcement of the plan. Typically, this information is
supplied to the fund by the offeror upon the expectation or explicit
agreement that the fund will assist the offeror in its bid for control
of the chosen target. This assistance most frequently takes the form
of acquisition of target company shares in the market, which are
"warehoused" by the fund and tendered to the offeror just prior to the
expiration of the public tender offer. The fund may also receive infor-
mation regarding an impending takeover from a target company re-
questing the fund to purchase target shares to assist in thwarting the
takeover bid.
1. Rule 10b-5
If purchases are made by the fund prior to the public announce-
ment of the tender offer, Rule 10b-5 09 becomes relevant. The precise
problem posed by Rule 10b-5 is whether a fund, having knowledge of
an offeror's plans for a takeover, violates the rule by making anticipa-
tory purchases of target company shares in the open market without
revealing its information to the public. Rule 10b-5 prohibits, in gen-
eral terms, the use of manipulative or deceptive practices in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of securities." While the language of
the rule does not seem to compel disclosure where no statements are
made in connection with a transaction," a long history of judicial
interpretations has imposed upon one party to a purchase or sale a
duty to disclose material facts not known to the other if a fiduciary
or other special relationship exists between them T 2 This duty may be
simply expressed in terms of the following formula: possession of
material facts + fiduciary or special relationship = duty of dis-
closure. For a mutual fund, the critical issues under the rule are thus
(1) the scope of information deemed to be material, and (2) the cir-
cumstances under which a fiduciary or special relationship is said to
exist between the parties to a transaction.
69
 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1971).
70
 The rule provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly .
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971).
71 Sections (a) and (c) of the rule make no specific reference to disclosure, while
section (b) seems to require disclosure of material facts only where "necessary in order
to make the statements made . . . not misleading" (emphasis added). See note 70
supra.
72 See notes 84-88 infra. Since the impersonal nature of the securities market makes
it unlikely that a fund would have any contact whatever with the other party to the
transaction, the requirement that information be disclosed to that party in effect requires
a public disclosure.
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Various courts have considered the nature of a "material fact,"
usually expressing their conclusions in broad, general terms." Al-
though the definitions differ in some respects," each decision cites the
earlier formulations. A recent SEC enforcement proceeding, Investors
Management Co.," posited the basic test emerging from these cases.
The SEC stated that material information is that which is of such
importance that it could be expected to affect the judgment of
investors as to whether to buy, hold or sell securities, and, if generally
known, to affect materially the market price of the stock."
The test of materiality, as developed by the courts and thus
formulated in Investors Management is exceptionally broad. Stock
prices move in response to the balance between the supply of and
demand for a company's stock, as determined by the collective deci-
sions of all investors. Investment decisions are frequently based upon
rumors, hunches, general economic conditions, world politics and
other factors bearing little or no relation to a fundamental appraisal of
a company's stock. Under such a broad test, corporate management
would be encouraged to disclose all corporate information having even
a remote possibility of influencing the price of the company's stock,
in order to avoid potential liability. No effort would be made to color
the facts by separating the significant from the meaningless ones. Far
from placing the individual investor on an equal footing with sophis-
ticated institutions or insiders, such disclosures would more likely
overwhelm him.
In order to protect the public from premature announcements
which might arouse speculative fervor, while concurrently attempting
73
 The definitions employed in the principal cases are, in chronological order, as
follows: a fact which would materially affect the judgment of the other party to the
transaction (Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947)); a fact
affecting the value of the stock which would have affected the judgment of the seller
(Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (Del. 1951)) ; a fact which in reason-
able and objective contemplation might affect the value of the company's securities
(Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963)) ; a fact to which a reasonable
man would attach importance in determining his choice of action in the transaction in
question (List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811, rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 933 (1965) (citing Restatement, Torts 9 538 (2) (a), and
W. Prosser, Torts 554-55)); information which is essentially extraordinary in nature and
which is reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the market price of the security
(SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (citing 51 Va. L. Rev.
1271, 1289), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1968)); a fact which affects the probable future of
the company, or which may affect the desire to investors to buy, hold or sell the company's
securities (SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F2d at 849).
74
 There is, for example, some distinction to be made between a fact which is
reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the stock price (language of Texas Gulf
Sulphur decision), and one which might affect the stock price (language of the Kohler
decision as quoted in List and Texas Gulf Sulphur). In addition, some courts utilizing
multipartite definitions made the parts mutually independent while others using the same
definition made the parts interdependent.
75 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267 (July 29, 1971), reprinted in
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1l 78,163 at 80,514.
To Id. at 80,519.
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to avoid any unnecessary narrowing of the type of information requir-
ing disclosure, the SEC in Investors Management, imposed certain
limitations upon the basic test of materiality. The Commission indi-
cated that included among the factors to be considered in determining
whether a particular piece of information falls within the ambit of the
broad test are (1) the degree of specificity of the information, (2) the
extent to which the information differs from existing public informa-
tion, and (3) the reliability of the information in light of its nature and
source and the circumstances under which it was received." In Inves-
tors Management information that the earnings of Douglas Aircraft
Co. would be significantly lower than expected was passed to institu-
tional investors by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., a
prospective underwriter for Douglas. The SEC found that this infor-
mation scored high on all the tests, and that it was indeed material."
Because the case involved sophisticated institutional investors for
whom information retrieval was part of the ordinary course of busi-
ness, the SEC emphasized that the information at issue was not merely
a link in a chain of analytical data, but was sufficiently extraordinary
to make its significance immediately clear.
Each of the SEC criteria contains an element of subjectivity and
the SEC offers no guidelines for deteimining when each criterion has
been met nor any indication as to how many of the criteria must be
met before the information will be deemed material. In a separate con-
curring opinion, Commissioner Smith observed that the materiality
test, as qualified by the majority, represented a "relatively high thresh-
old of materiality.' 7') This conclusion is not readily apparent from the
majority opinion.
Significantly, the Investors Management case did not involve an
attempted takeover of a publicly held company. The case, therefore,
is distinguishable on its facts from the typical situation in which a
mutual fund receives nonpublic information regarding such a takeover.
In Investors Management, the fact in question—information regarding
a reduction in earnings—related to an event, or course of events,
which had already occurred. In a takeover situation, the pertinent
fact—receipt of information concerning a possible tender offer—relates
to a future corporate event. Thus, while the qualifications imposed upon
the basic test of materiality in Investors Management seem appro-
priate to the facts of that case, they do not appear to accommodate
the factual situation in a takeover. More closely on point is the deci-
sion in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.," where the court noted that,
when facts relate to a particular event, their materiality does not de-
pend solely on the expected impact that the occurrence of the event
77 Id.
78 Id. at 80,519-80,521.
70 Id. at 80,523.
80 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1968).
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might have on the company or the market. Rather, the magnitude of
the event in the overall corporate picture must be balanced against
the indicated probability that the event will occur 81
It is important to recognize that, in the context of a corporate
takeover, the relevant event, whose probable occurrence must be
assessed, is the tender offer and not the success of the takeover bid.
Although the success of the takeover bid may be the more important
corporate event, it is well known that the market responds to the an-
nouncement of a tender offer. The probability that the tender offer
will be made is generally greater than the probability that the take-
over bid will succeed. Thus, when a mutual fund receives a tip regard-
ing a possible takeover bid, there is a clear necessity for distinguishing
rumor from material facts. This is not always a simple task. The fact
that a fund is willing to invest on the basis of certain information
should not create a presumption of materiality. 82 The superior analyti-
cal skills and market knowledge of a fund, which enable it to assess the
plausibility of a rumor more accurately than the average investor,
should not alone render the rumor material. In addition, the im-
position upon a fund, or any investor, of the risk that information he
possesses, which may be only rumor or projection at the time of the
transaction, will subsequently become a material fact subjecting him to
liability for nondisclosure is an unwarranted burden. Texas Gulf
Sulphur appears to indicate that, before liability attaches, the mate-
riality of the information must be established as of the time the pos-
sessor acted and not in light of subsequent events s8
Despite the lack of direct precedent with regard to takeover bids,
some conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing discussion. Based
on the criteria discussed, it seems reasonable to conclude that a fund
having direct knowledge from an offeror regarding the latter's exten-
sive but undisclosed financial commitment to make a tender offer for
a particular target, and its present ability to do so, possesses material
information. Such information is specific, new and reliable. It is likely
to affect the target's future, and would, if disclosed, affect both the
decisions of investors and the market price of the company's secur-
ities. The information is probably material despite the fact that it does
not originate with the target company and that the target may not
even be aware such information exists. It seems equally reasonable
to state that a fund which knows only that someone is interested in
accumulating stock in a particular target for a possible takeover bid
is not in possession of material facts. This is true even though dis-
closure of such information might affect the actions of speculative in-
vestors as well as the stock price. Between these two situations, how-
ever, there is a considerable area of ambiguity.
The typical situation involving fund participation falls closer to
81 Id. at 849.
82 Id. at 877 (dissenting opinion of Judge Moore).
83 Id.
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the former hypothetical than to the latter—a fund which is asked to
participate in a takeover is informed in some detail of the impending
tender offer by the person contemplating the bid. Thus it would ap-
pear that, more often than not, the information held by the fund
would be deemed material even under a narrow interpretation of the
term. The materiality of the information, however, does not alone
establish the duty to disclose. As noted, disclosure is required only if
a fiduciary or other special relationship exists between the parties to
the transaction.
The final issue, then, is whether a fund receiving material infor-
mation from a prospective tender offeror or from the target company
is in a fiduciary position when it makes purchases in anticipation of
the tender offer. The cases have uniformly held that "insider" status
gives rise to a fiduciary responsibility with respect to transactions to
which the insider is a party.84 There appears to be unanimous agree-
ment among courts as to the insider status of issuers,"officers and
directors," controlling stockholders," and other employees." How-
ever, these groups do not exhaust the classes of persons upon whom
Rule 10b-5 imposes an obligation. In Cady, Roberts & Co.," which
involved an alleged violation of Rule 1013-5 by a registered broker-
dealer who had received material inside information directly from a
corporate director, the SEC analyzed the obligation of disclosure as
resting on two principal elements:
[F first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly
or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for
a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of any-
one, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a
party takes advantage of such information knowing it is
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing."
Thus the Commission extended the traditional concept of a corporate
fiduciary to include persons having a special relationship with a com-
pany and privy to its internal affairs.'
Since information possessed by a mutual fund participating in a
84 Sec cases cited in notes 85-88 infra.
85 Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
80 Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ; List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,
340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Northern Trust Co. v.
Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (ND. III. 1952) ; Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum
Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
87 Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966); Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 808 (D.Del. 1951), 135 F. Supp. 176 (Del. 1955), aff'd 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir.
1956).
88
 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1968).
80 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
90
 Id. at 912 (footnote omitted). Also cited in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d at 848.
91
 Id. See also Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909) (citing cases).
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takeover bid is not obtained through a direct relationship with the
issuer, the fund cannot be classified as an insider in the traditional
sense. However, a more difficult question is raised with regard to its
status as a "tippee," that is, one unrelated to the corporation who re-
ceives inside information from another who does stand in a fiduciary
relationship with the issuer. A number of cases bear on this question.
In Ross v. Licht," a group of tippees had actively participated in
the insider-tippers' plan to defraud the minority stockholders in their
close corporation by inducing them to sell their stock at a price un-
reasonably low in view of certain material inside information with-
held from the minority. The information concerned plans for a
private placement and a public offering of the corporation's shares,
both at prices above that offered to the minority. The court held that
the purchasers, whether they were called insiders, tippees, or aiders
and abettors, were under the same duty of disclosure affecting tradi-
tional insiders; hence their failure to make the required disclosures
violated Rule 10b-5.°3 While the defrauding of minority stockholders
by withholding material information is somewhat analogous to the
situation in which information about a takeover bid is passed to mutual
funds, Ross is distinguishable because it involved a close corporation
and transactions on a personal level. More importantly, the informa-
tion was passed to the tippees directly from an inside source.
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.," since the tippees involved
were not made defendants, the court found it unnecessary to decide
whether their conduct, in light of their possession of material inside
information and the knowledge that it was undisclosed, had violated
Rule 10b-5. The court did note, however, that such conduct was as
reprehensible as that of the insider source." The implication in that
dictum is that tippees may be held liable where they know that the
information they possess is nonpublic and that they are acting im-
properly by using it. While these limitations may be significant in
situations where, as here, individual investors were involved, they
would provide no defense for an institutional investor that would
doubtlessly be charged with full knowledge of the circumstances in
which it acted and the likely effects of its action. Its own subjective
opinion as to the propriety of its action would be irrelevant. Neverthe-
less, Texas Gulf Sulphur is distinguishable, as was Ross, from the
typical situation faced by a mutual fund, on the ground that the in-
formation again came to the tippees from an inside corporate source.
The peculiar characteristics of the institutional tippee were in-
volved in Investors Management Co." In that case, one investment
92 263 F. Sapp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
93 Id. at 410.
94 401 F,2d 833 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1968).
95 Id. at 852-53.
96 [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 78,163 (SEC 1971), aff'g
[1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,832 (SEC 1970) (decision of
bearing examiner).
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management company, six investment advisors and six hedge funds all
had sold securities of Douglas Aircraft Co. while possessing inside in-
formation received from Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
The latter had had access to Douglas's internal corporate affairs by
reason of an underwriting relationship. In holding the tippees liable, the
SEC made it clear that the obligation to disclose material inside informa-
tion prior to dealing in a company's, securities extends beyond those
who possess such information by reason of traditional corporate
relationships 97 Three requisites for tippee liability were listed: (1)
the information in question must be material and nonpublic; (2) the
tippee, whether he receives the information directly or indirectly,
must have reason to know that it was nonpublic and that it was ob-
tained improperly by selective 'revelation or otherwise; and (3) the
information must be a factor in the tippee's decision to effect the
transaction."
Of these criteria, only the second in any way concerns the rela-
tionship of the tippee to the source of the information. The SEC
noted that although the case of an indirect recipient presents problems
of factual proof of the requisite knowledge, the need for the protec-
tion afforded by Rule 10b-5 is the same as in situations where the in-
formation is possessed by insiders." In addition, there was a sugges-
tion that tippees engaged in professiOnal securities activities ought to
be subjected to a stricter standard because they have both the access
to substantial investment funds , and the sophistication to appraise and
capitalize upon the market effect of the information.'" The implica-
tion of Investors Management, for a mutual fund 'receiving material
information is that the fund will be presumed to have constructive
knowledge as to whether the information it possesses has been dis-
seminated in a manner making it generally available to investors, and
as to the advantage that the information affords over others with
whom the fund may deal. Because of this presumption, mutual funds
will be unable to rely upon the insulation against liability afforded by
the difficulty of proving actual knowledge.
A reexamination of the Investors Management and Texas Gulf
Sulphur criteria for tippee liability reveals only one factor that pre-
vents liability for a fund knowingly utilizing material information in
its possession: whether or' not the information was "improperly ob-
tained." This factor appears to make the imposition of liability on a
tippee totally dependent upon a finding that the information origi-
nated with an inside "tipper," in violation of his fiduciary duty to the
corporation concerned. Cady, Roberts, Ross, Texas Gulf Sulphur, and
Investors Management all involved information which reached the
tippees directly or indirectly from an inside corporate source. Thus,
97
 Id. at 80,518.
98 Id. at 80,519.
9 Id. at 80,521.
100 Id.
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where a mutual fund receives information concerning a takeover from
a target company seeking the fund's aid in defensive maneuvers, the
requisites of liability are present. However, where the fund receives
the information from the offeror planning a takeover, the question is
more difficult. In this situation, the fund's liability depends on
whether the offeror is considered to be an insider, or a tippee (making
the fund a second-generation tippee). The cases considering this prob-
lem are not numerous.
There is some indication that, in certain situations, a person
making a takeover bid will be considered an insider. In Ward
LaFrance Truck Corp.,101 the Commission held that a corporation
which had agreed to purchase a controlling block of stock in an issuer
and which had been given access to information not generally avail-
able to other stockholders was an insider under Rule 10b-5. The Com-
mission did not comment on the probable status of a tender offeror who
made no contact with the target. In Hughes & Treat,'" a violation
of Rule 10b-5 was alleged to have been committed by an offeror
making market purchases pursuant to a takeover bid after it had been
revealed to and approved by the issuer's board of directors, but prior
to notification of shareholders. Although the case was resolved by a
negotiated settlement, the Commission indicated that there existed a
substantial question as to whether the offeror was an insider and
whether it had some fiduciary obligation.
The salient aspect of Ward LaFrance and Hughes & Treat
which distinguishes these cases from the typical tender offer situation
is that they involved voluntary takeovers—i.e., takeovers to which
the target company's management agreed or in which management
participated. Where, as in these two cases, management's amenability
to the takeover facilitates access to corporate information, or assures
the successful consummation of the takeover, the offeror is justifiably
considered an insider for purposes of Rule 10b-5. Mutual fund par-
ticipation in a voluntary takeover situation seems certain to give rise
to tippee liability if target company securities are purchased subse-
quent to management-offeror accord. However, in an involuntary take-
over situation, liability of either the offeror or the participating mutual
funds seems remote. In Mills and Williams v. Sarjem Corp.,'" the
failure of an offeror syndicate to disclose its plans for immediate sale
of the corporate assets was held not to violate Rule 10b-5, since the
plan could have been conceived by anyone; thus, the offeror was not
considered an insider within the meaning of the rule. Securities trans-
actions, the court indicated, generally involve some degree of spec-
ulation, and are usually motivated by a difference of opinion between
the purchaser and seller regarding the future prospects of the security
involved. Any seller must anticipate that the purchaser has a profit-
101 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943).
102 22 S.E.C. 623 (1946).
103 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955).
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making purpose in mind. Thus the court determined that, in the ab-
sence of any fiduciary duty existing by reason of an inside relationship,
the purchaser is under no obligation to divulge its plans.'"
In Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc.,' - ' the plaintiff alleged
that in making a tender offer for shares of S.H. Kress and Company
the defendant offeror had violated Rule 10b-5 by its failure to dis-
close, inter alia, that Kress's real estate was worth substantially more
than the value at which it was carried in the company's financial state-
ments. The court held that the tender offeror, which was a stranger to
the corporation, did not violate a duty by its silence since it possessed
no information that was not generally available to the public!" The
court took note of pending federal legislation regarding disclosure in
corporate takeovers (the Williams Amendments) and inferred that ex-
isting regulation, including Rule 10b-5, did not adequately cover this
area.
These cases reveal a reluctance on the part of courts and the
SEC to treat an outside offeror as an insider or as one having a fidu-
ciary duty. While it may still be argued that an offeror who possesses
no nonpublic information about a target other than his own plans to
acquire control should be encumbered with a duty by virtue of that
knowledge alone, such is not the present state of the law. When the
SEC first suggested in the Cady, Roberts case that the duties of a
fiduciary could be imposed upon persons other than insiders, the
Commission required a special relationship which made such a person
privy to the internal af airs of the corporation. 1°7 Regardless of the
manner in which a takeover bid is construed, it cannot be considered
as part of a corporation's internal affairs. In addition, there is lan-
guage in the Investors Management decision which clearly indicates
that no liability can attach to a tippee unless (1) the issuer was the
source of the informant's knowledge, and (2) the tippee knew or had
reason to know that the information was made available by reason
of a breach of duty to the corporation not to disclose or use the infor-
mation for a noncorporate purpose.' 0s
On balance, it appears that a fund will be subject to liability
under Rule 10b-5 only when it purchases shares in a target company
and, at the time of purchase, it has received but not disclosed, con-
crete information regarding an impending tender offer from a corpo-
rate insider. Where the fund receives information, albeit material,
104 Id. at 764.
105 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
106 Id. at 545. The case also turned, in part, on the fact that the plaintiffs had not
tendered shares to the defendant, but rather had purchased shares on plaintiffs' advice, and
thus had no standing to sue under Rule 1013-5. Id.
107 See text at note 91 supra.
108 L1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 80,523-24 (concurring
opinion of Commissioner Smith). The Commissioner further argued that the emphasis in
such cases should be on policing insiders and their privies rather than on policing the
possession of information per se in an effort to reduce relative informational advantages in
the market, a concept too vague to be applied with any consistency. Id.
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about a contemplated takeover bid from an outside offeror, liability
is unlikely."' Thus the traditional circumstances of fund participation
do not seem to pose a serious threat of 10b-5 liability and, to date, no
court has imposed such liability on a mutual fund.
At first glance it may seem that this insulation from liability will
be detrimental to persons trading in securities who are ignorant of an
impending tender offer. However, the Williams Amendments of 1968
were enacted to prevent this result. The Amendments clearly state the
disclosure requirements for a tender offer situation. To the extent that
Congress has recognized the problems in this area and has enacted
remedial legislation to resolve them, disclosure other than that re-
quired by statute seems inappropriate. Of course, there may remain a
small fraction of investors unproteCted by the statutory requirements.
There is a point, however, beyond which the philosophy of disclosure
is confronted with the realities of the market place; the previous dis-
cussion suggested that the circumstances requiring disclosure may be
ambiguous. In the final analysis, standards must be established which
will insure both that the information received by investors is signif-
icant and that disclosure is required only upon the occurrence of a
specific and ascertainable event. That the standards set are sometimes
somewhat arbitrary is to be expected.
2. Rules 10b -6 and 10b -13
The foregoing discussion has been concerned with potential lia-
bility under Rule 10b-5 in situations where a mutual fund purchases
target company shares prior to publication of a tender'offer. When a
mutual fund purchases target company shares after a public exchange
offer has been announced, Rule 10b-6 becomes significant. Rule 10b-6
makes it unlawful for any person participating directly or indirectly
in a distribution of securities to purchase those securities, or any
rights to purchase those securities, until after his participation is com-
pleted.'" The purpose of Rule 10b-6 is to prevent those persons par-
ticipating in a distribution of securities from manipulating the market
100 There are, however, a variety of ways in which a fund might participate that
could involve receipt of information from an inside source. Such a situation would exist
where a fund is asked by an offeror to purchase its shares in order to maintain the
market price for a forthcoming tender offer; or where a fund is asked by the target
company to purchase its shares as a defense against a takeover; or where a fund is
purchasing target shares to assist an offeror, and either the fund or the offeror has a
director in common with the target.
110
 Rule 10b-6 provides, in relevant part, that:
(a) It shall constitute a "manipulative device or contrivance" as used in
section 10(h) of the act for any person, [who is an underwriter, prospective
underwriter, broker, dealer,] or other person who has agreed to participate or is
participating in such a distribution, directly or indirectly . . . to bid for or pur-
chase for any account in which he has a beneficial interest, any security which
is the subject of such distribution, or any security of the same class and series,
or any right to purchase any such security, or to attempt to induce any person
to purchase any such security or right, until after he has completed his participa-
tion in such distribution.
1136
MUTUAL FUNDS IN CORPORATE TAKEOVERS
by bidding for those same securities and thereby creating the impres-
sion of an active market, which would facilitate their distribution at
"artificially high prices.' Typically, mutual fund involvement in an
exchange offer takes the form of a purchase of target company shares
pursuant to an express or implied agreement to tender them to an
offeror under the terms of the public exchange offer. The critical ques-
tions for the fund are whether its purchase of target company secur-
ities is a purchase of the securities to be distributed by the offeror and,
if so, whether such purchase constitutes indirect participation in the
distribution in violation of Rule 10b-6.
A distribution of securities consists of the entire process by
which, in the course of a public offering, a block of securities is dis-
persed and ultimately comes to rest in the hands of the investing
public.112
 Rule 10b-6, subsection (b), states that the distribution of a
security which is immediately exchangeable for or convertible into
another security, or which entitles the holder to receive another secur-
ity, is considered to be a distribution of that other security within the
meaning of the rule. 113 Similarly, the purchase of a convertible or ex-
changeable security must be considered as a purchase of the security
received in conversion or exchange."' When a mutual fund, or any
other investor, purchases target company securities during an ex-
change offer, it acquires the right to receive the offeror's securities.
Thus the purchase of target securities is a purchase of the offeror's
securities which are being distributed. Such a purchase, even if made
for resale, does not itself violate Rule 10b-6. No purchaser would be
held to have violated the rule unless it were found to be participating
in the distribution.
The difficult problem under Rule 10b-6 is defining the circum-
stances under which a fund or other investor will be held to have
"participated" in the distribution of the securities offered by the com-
pany making the takeover bid. Rule 10b-6, subsection (a) (3), refers
to, but does not define, the "other participating persons" against whom
the prohibitions of the rule are to apply. Reference to Section 2 (11)
of the Securities Act.'" suggests, by analogy, that the key to a fund's
status as a participant is whether it has acquired the shares for in-
vestment purposes or with a view to "distribution." The SEC has met
the difficulty of ascertaining the intention of a purchaser at the time
111 SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904, 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (citing L. Loss,
Securities Regulation 883-84 (1951)); Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 280
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (citing 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1596 (2d ed. 1961)).
112 Jaffee
 & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8866 (Apr. 20, 1970),
11969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 77,805 at 83,858 n.5 (citing
Oklahoma-Texas Trust, 2 S.E.C. 764, 769 (1937), aff'd, 100 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1939)).
118 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(b) (1971).
114
 SEC Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1 at 547 (1963).
115 Section 2(11) of the 1933 Act includes in the definition of "underwriter" any
person who has purchased securities from an issuer with a view to distribution. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(b)(11) (1970).
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of acquisition by considering subsequent acts and circumstances in
making this factual determination.'" Important factors evidencing
the purchaser's intent are the length of the holding period between
purchase and resale, the nature of the purchaser's business, and any
unforeseeable change in circumstances." 7
Since funds do not generally plan to hold the offeror's securities
as a prolonged investment, but will either sell their "rights" (target
shares) to arbitragers shortly before the expiration of the offer period
or exchange the target shares and sell the securities received, they act
as a link in a chain of transactions that move the securities being dis-
tributed from the issuer into the hands of the public."' Thus it is
submitted that when a fund purchases target shares during an ex-
change offer and temporarily "warehouses" them on behalf of the
offeror, it facilitates the distribution of the offeror's securities and it
therefore participates in such distribution within the meaning of Rule
10b-6. The purchases initiate the fund's participation and must, there-
fore, occur before its participation is completed, thus violating the
rule.
Even if "participation" in such a case could not be shown, there
is a danger that where a fund purchases the shares pursuant to an
agreement with the offeror made during or even prior to the exchange
offer, it could be found to be acting as the offeror's agent and thus
aiding and abetting a violation of Rule 10b-6 by the offeror. Such a
finding would be particularly likely where compensation other than
the market price/tender price differential had been agreed upon. 119
Although no fund has yet been held liable for such violations, the dis-
cussion is not strictly academic. In a number of cases involving take-
over bids where violations of Rule 10b-6 were proved or alleged,
participating funds have only fortuitously escaped liability. The liti-
gation resulting from the 1969 contest over control of Armour & Co.,
reported in Armour & Co. v. General Host Corp., 12° is such a situa-
tion. In Armour, General Host had made an exchange offer for Armour
shares. Armour management opposed the offer and persuaded Grey-
hound Corp. to make a competing cash tender offer. 121
 General Host
then solicited purchases of Armour shares by institutional investors,
and a number of mutual funds were induced to purchase Armour
116
 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972) (adoption of Rule 144),
[Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,847 at 81,053.
117
 Id. While no particular holding period would be conclusive as to the intention
of the purchaser, the opinion of the Commission's General Counsel was that retention for
one year, if not contradicted by other evidence, would create a strong inference of a
purchase for investment. SEC Securities Act Release No. 1862 (Dec. 14, 1938), 17 C.F.R.
231.1862 (1971).
118
 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972), [Current] CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. 11 78,847 at 81,053.
119 See text at notes 26-30 supra.
120
 296 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
121 Id. at 472.
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shares for the purpose of tendering them to General Host pursuant to
the terms of its exchange offer. 122
Armour sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction enjoining General Host from effecting the exchange. The
complaint alleged that a conspiracy existed to gain control of Armour
through manipulative, misleading and deceptive practices in violation
of Rule 10b-5, and that such purpose was carried out in part through
transactions executed in violation of Rule 10b-6. 121 Specifically, Ar-
mour alleged that Kleiner, Bell, a broker-dealer participating with
General Host in the takeover bid, had urged a mutual fund to pur-
chase 150,000 shares of Armour stock in two large block transactions
which had been executed by the broker during the effective period of
the General Host registration.im These shares were all subsequently
tendered to General Host by the fund involved.
The court, relying on the testimony of an officer of the defendant
brokerage firm, found that the fund's buy order was unsolicited by the
broker and that the transactions were thus exempt from the require-
ments of Rule 10b-6.'" However, after investigating the case in con-
nection with its Institutional Investor Study, the SEC reported that
the block purchases were, in fact, made by the fund at the urging of
the brokerage firm. 120
 If the court bad had the benefit of the SEC's
findings to rebut the defendant's testimony, it might well have held
that the transactions were nonexempt. The court, however, also noted
that substantial legal issues existed as to whether Rule 10b-6(b) ap-
plies to the stock of the target as well as to that of the distributor.127
In expressing doubt as to this point, the court relied on the fact that
the SEC had permitted General Host's registration statement to be-
come effective after Armour had pinpointed its claims of violation and
had brought their contentions to the notice of the Commission's
Chairman.us The registration statement contained language by which
General Host clearly reserved the right to purchase Armour securities
outside of the exchange offer after the date of filing but prior to the
effective date of the offer.' 29
122
 See Institutional Investor Study Report of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2805 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SEC
Institutional Investor Study].
123 296 F. Supp. at 471 & n.l.
124
 Id. at 476; SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 122, at 2805.
125 Id. at 476. The exemption noted is found at 17 C,F.R. § 240.10b-6(a)(3)(v)
(1971).
126
 SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 122, at 2805.
127 296 F. Supp. at 476 & n.18. Rule 10b-6(b) makes the prohibitions with regard
to the specific securities being distributed applicable to securities which are immediately
exchangeable into those securities or entitle the purchaser to acquire those securities. 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(b) (1971).
128 296 F. Supp. at 473, 475.
129 General Host reserves the right in its sole discretion . . • prior to the date
the Registration Statement becomes effective, to enter into firm arrangements for
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Significantly, the very activity provided for in that registration
statement was about to be prohibited under proposed Rule 10b-13,
which the SEC claimed was simply a codification of existing inter-
pretations under Rule 10b-6. 13° The apparent contradiction between
the position taken by the SEC Division of Corporate Finance, respon-
sible for examination of registration statements, and that of the Divi-
sion of Trading and Markets, which proposes new rules, has been
viewed critically as revealing serious internal inconsistencies in SEC
policy.131
 In any case, serious confusion existed as to the application
of Rule 10b-6 to the shares of the target where an exchange offer is
used to effect a corporate takeover.
Six months after Armour, a somewhat similar case, Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp.,n 2 arose in the District Court
for the Southern District of New York, presenting an opportunity for
clarification of the 10b-6 requirements. Chris-Craft and Bangor Punta
were engaged in a fight for control of Piper Aircraft Corp., having
made competing exchange offers for outstanding Piper shares. 183 Ban-
gor Punta had acquired 120,200 Piper shares in five cash transactions
during the time its exchange offer was in registration. Chris-Craft sued
to enjoin Bangor Punta, inter alia, from voting the shares on the ground
that the purchases violated Rule 10b-6. 184 Although the purchases
could not be fitted within any of the explicit exemptions to the rule,
Judge Tenney nevertheless found nothing objectionable in the trans-
actions. He concluded that the purchases were clearly not designed to
place market pressures on the Piper stock for the purpose of creating
an artificially high price, since such an increase in price would make
the acquisition of Armour Common Stock by purchase in the open market at
prevailing market prices or through negotiated purchases, or by concluding ar-
rangements for the sale and delivery of securities, including the [General Host]
Debentures and Warrants (subject to necessary shareholder approval and ap-
proval of counsel as to certain legal matters), to the sellers of any such Armour
Common Stocks so acquired.
SEC Registration Statement No. 241224 on Form S-1 filed by General Host Corp. on
December 30, 1968 at 8, quoted in Lowenfels, Rule 10b-13 and Rule 10b-6, 69 Colum. L.
Rev. 1392, 1408 (1969).
tao SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8712 (Oct. 8, 1969), [1969-1970
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. L. Rep. ¶ 77,745 at 83,709.
tat Lowenfels, supra note 129 at 1408. Mr. Lowenfels notes that although the SEC
does not approve or disapprove of securities registered with it, nor pass upon the accuracy
or adequacy of prospectuses, the relevant language of the General Host prospectus was
retained through two amended versions and appeared in the final prospectus without any
questions under Rule 10b-6 being raised by the Division of Corporate Finance.
182 Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 303 F. Supp. 191 (S,D.N.Y.
1969), aff'd, (sub nom.) as to denial of preliminary injunction, rev'd, as to alternative
holding that securities laws were not violated, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 11 92,510 (2d Cir. 1969) (unreported), aff'd, 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970) (en
banc).
133 426 F.2d at 571.
234 303 F. Supp. at 193.
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the Bangor Punta exchange offer less attractive to Piper share-
holders.'"
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that such
purchases of target company securities and the increase in price likely
to result could easily mislead small unsophisticated investors to believe
"that the price increases resulted] solely from the bullish effect
of the exchange offer on the market . • . [and] . . . not from cash
purchases in addition to the offer." 13° The court concluded that "Pre-
vention of this kind of manipulation seems well within the spirit of
Rule 10b-6," 137 and held that the Bangor Punta purchases violated the
rule.
This resolution, at least for the Second Circuit, of the applicability
of Rule 10b-6 to target company shares has significant implications for
mutual fund participants in takeover bids. In retrospect, the result in
the Armour case may be said to be incorrect; the decision turned on a
transactional exemption based on testimony later found by the SEC to
be inaccurate, and on a doubt in the mind of the district court which
the appellate court found to be unjustified. It is not a long judicial step
from finding a violation by a broker who urges such a transaction to a
finding of aiding and abetting the violation on the part of a fund which
knowingly facilitates it. However, the significance of these cases for
mutual fund participants in corporate takeovers is not limited to situ-
ations involving a middleman. If fund purchases of target company
securities at the instigation of a participating broker-dealer violate Rule
10b-6, then, a fortiori, similar purchases pursuant to an agreement with
the issuer also violate the rule. Although the fund was not made a
defendant in the Armour case, if such a situation arises again, a par-
ticipating fund might find itself facing the inconvenience and expense
of defending itself in protracted litigation and the possibility of a costly
judgment. However, when such cases arise in the future, Rule 10b-13,
which became effective in October, 1969, will be of primary importance.
The adoption of Rule 10b-13' 88 firmly resolved in the negative
the question as to whether a tender offeror may legally purchase tar-
get company securities outside the terms of its pending offer. Rule
10b-13 prohibits any person making a cash tender or exchange offer
from going outside that offer to purchase the desired securities or any
securities immediately convertible into or exchangeable for those se-
curities. This prohibition is in effect from the time the offer is publicly
announced, or otherwise communicated to holders of the securities to
be acquired, until the offer is terminated.'" An unfortunate effect of
Rule 10b-13 from the point of view of target company shareholders is
185 Id. at 198.
138 426 rid at 577.
137
 Id.
138 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1971).
138 Id. at subsection (a).
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that the prohibition of purchases of target shares by the offeror out-
side the exchange offer prevents the free market appreciation of the
target securities that would result from such purchases. Prohibition of
purchases prior to the effective date of the offer prevents the offering
price from being set higher than it now will be set; prohibition of pur-
chases after the offer becomes effective prevents the offering price from
being increased. As a result, the value of the offeror's shares is artifi-
cially enhanced, relative to those of the target to be exchanged,' and
consideration offered to target company shareholders for their shares,
in either a cash tender or exchange offer, will be diminished.
In spite of this problem, Rule 10b-13 is presently the law and it
applies, as does Rule 10b-6, to transactions made in the context of cor-
porate takeovers. The combined effect of the two rules is (1) to pre-
vent funds which could be found to be participating in a distribution
under Rule 10b-6 from purchasing any target shares during a public
exchange offer; and (2) to prevent funds which purchase target shares
during a cash tender offer, or during a public exchange offer in which
they are not participating, from receiving any consideration (cash or
securities) greater than that available to the public by the terms of
the offer.
Thus, if mutual fund participation in corporate takeovers, effected
through tender offers, is to continue on privately negotiated terms, the
purchase of target shares by a fund and the subsequent sale to the
offeror must take place prior to any public announcement of the offer.
Purchases made prior to the inception of the offer period are not pro-
hibited by the rule, although any purchases made within sixty days
prior to the announcement of the offer must be disclosed in Schedule
14D to be filed by the offeror."' While the transfer could also be le-
gally made after the expiration of the offer; this would leave the trans-
action open to charges that it was effected pursuant to an agreement or
understanding reached during the offer period, in violation of Rule
10b-13.142 By forcing offerors and participating funds to consummate
their transactions prior to the offer period, the rules may be expected
to produce pre-offer agreements containing inducements such as most-
favored-stockholder clauses, profit-sharing clauses, buy-out provisions
and others, all designed to compensate the funds for relinquishing their
target shares to the offeror prior to the time that the market in those
shares may be expected to peak.
C. Transactions with "Affiliated Persons"
Another problem arising from the relationship between a takeover
offeror and a participating mutual fund is posed by Section 17(d) of
140 This was well understood by Judge Tenny as his opinion in Christ-Craft demon-
strates. See text at note 135 supra.
141 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1971).
142 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13(a) (1971).
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the Investment Company Act of 1940. 143 Section 17(d) makes it un-
lawful for an affiliated person of a registered investment company to
effect a transaction in which the investment company is a joint or a
joint-and-several participant in contravention of rules prescribed by
the SEC. Such rules are to be established for the purpose of preventing
injury to fund shareholders arising from participation by the fund on
a basis different from, or less advantageous than, that of the affiliated
participant. 144 The law appears to be aimed at situations in which
affiliated persons, who make or influence the investment decisions of
a fund, and who may have a personal financial interest in the securities
of a portfolio company, overreach the fund for the benefit of the affil-
iated person.146
Rule 17d-1,146
 promulgated by the SEC pursuant to its authority
under section 17(d), requires persons affiliated with investment com-
panies to apply for SEC approval before engaging in any joint enter-
prise or arrangement with such company. Section 2(a) (3) of the In-
vestment Company Act defines an "affiliated person" as including:
1. any person owning or controlling five percent of the
fund's outstanding shares;
2. any person whose shares are five percent owned or con-
trolled by the fund;
3. any person otherwise controlling, controlled by, or under
common control with the fund;
143
 The section, in relevant part, provides:
(d) It shall be unlawful for any affiliated person of . . . a registered invest-
ment company . . . or any affiliated person of such a person • . • to effect any
transaction in which such registered company, or a company controlled by such
registered company, is a joint or a joint and several participant with such person
. . . in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe for the purpose of limiting or preventing participation by such registered or
controlled company on a basis different from or less advantageous than that of
such other participant.
15 U.S.C. I 80a-17(d) (1970).
144 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(d) (1970). The final version of the 1940 Act gave the SEC
rule-making power to regulate transactions by affihitated persons; the original Senate ver-
sion of the Act, however, prohibited such transactions. entirely. S. 3580 1 17(a) (4), 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
145
 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5128 (Oct. 13, 1967), [1966-1967
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. § 77,477 at 82,949.
146
 The rule provides:
(a) No affiliatdd person of . . . any registered investment company . • . and no
affiliated person of such a person ... acting as principal, shall participate in, or ef-
fect any transaction in connection with, any joint enterprise or other joint ar-
rangement or profit-sharing plan in which any such registered company, or a com-
pany controlled by such registered company, is a participant, and which is
entered into, adopted or modified subsequent to the effective date of this rule,
unless an application regarding such joint enterprise, arrangement or profit-shar-
ing plan has been filed with the Commission and had been granted by an order
entered prior to the submission of such plan or modification to security holders
for approval, or prior to such adoption or modification if not so submitted.
17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-1 (1971).
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4. any officer, director, or employee of the fund; and
5. the fund's investment advisor.147
A "joint enterprise or other arrangement" is, in turn, defined by Rule
17d-1 as "any written or oral plan, contract, authorization or ar-
rangement, or any practice or understanding . . . [in which an in-
vestment company and an affiliated person jointly participate or] share
in the profits.. . >1148
In a takeover situation, the issue is not one of potential liability
on the part of the fund, bUt rather the burden to be imposed on certain
offerors who woul&seek to utilize the fund's resources. This question,
of course, has broad significance for the future of fund participation
in corporate control contests. The foundations of judicial interpreta-
tion regarding section 17(d), however, were not laid in the context
of a corporate takeover bid. In SEC v. Midwest Technical Develop-
ment Corp.,'" directors of a closed-end investment company invested
in the securities of ten companies whose securities were also held by
the fund. The SEC contended that such investments constituted joint
arrangements with affiliated persons and thus required prior SEC ap-
proval. The situation was complicated by the fact that the fund's in-
vestments provided venture capital to its portfolio companies, many
of which were organized, promoted or run by the defendant directors
of the fund.
The court noted that the broad language of section 17(d) pre-
cluded a narrow interpretation of the terms "joint venture" and "joint
enterprise." The court found that all the defendant directors were
"affiliated persons" of the fund, and that the facts revealed sufficient
collaboration to warrant the finding that a joint enterprise existed.
Heavy investments by the fund in certain portfolio securities had been
induced by directors who had assisted in organizing the companies, in
order to assure the safety of their initial investments. Investments in
other portfolio companies made by the affiliated directors followed
substantial investments by the fund in those companies, which strength-
ened the companies' financial structures and reduced the initial invest-
ment risk to the directors.
The court concluded, however, that the directors bad not schemed
to utilize the fund for their personal gain, but were simply ignorant
of their duty to avoid a conflict of interests between their duties as
directors and their concern for the welfare of their own investments.
The disparity between the profits made by the directors and those
made by the fund was explained by the court as resulting from the
investment limitations imposed on the fund by its stated investment
objectives and policy. The court emphasized that there are no pro-
147 15 U.S.C.	 80a-2(a)(3) (1970).
148 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-1(c) (1971).
149
 [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. § 91,252 (D. Minn. 1963).
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visions in the Investment Company Act which prohibit the purchase of
portfolio stocks by an investment company director.
Thus, although the court found that the Act and the rules had
been violated, it was sympathetic to the defendants and imposed no
judicial sanctions. More significant for mutual funds participating in
takeover bids, however, was the court's statement that the case at bar,
involving a small investment company and local interlocking directors,
was to be distinguished from situations involving directors of large
investment funds and nationally traded securities in which a joint ven-
ture or enterprise would be extremely difficult to identify. It further
appears that the case turned, at least in part, on the court's recogni-
tion of the detrimental effect which a transaction by one of the joint
participants could have upon the market price of the security involved,
and thus upon the value of the shares held by the other participant.
The court noted that the fund's sale of a large block of stock in one
of its portfolio companies might have shaken the confidence of other
investors in its stability, to the detriment of the directors who had
substantial holdings in the stock. It is submitted that the same prob-
lems arise in the case of securities traded on a national exchange when
the "joint venture" involves an investment of millions of dollars by
a large mutual fund and a takeover offeror. The scale is larger, but
the principles are the same. A sale by the affiliated offeror• could have
a great impact on the price of the securities sold, to the detriment of
the fund. Although the court did not define the requifements for a
joint venture, other than to suggest that . a strict interpretation of the
term would be inappropriate,, the case may be read as requiring SEC
approval whenever funds and their affiliated persons invest in the same
security on a scale creating the potential for stock "manipulation" by
one for the benefit of the other.
Apparently the Midwest decision engendered a good deal of con-
fusion within the industry. In 1967, the SEC proposed a revision of
Rule 17d-I 15° on the ground that, "Under the present Rule, it is in
some circumstances unclear whether an application should or should
not be filed. . . In an effort to provide more exact standards as
to whether and when a fund and its affiliated person must file an ap-
plication with respect to certain transactions, the SEC proposed a
number of guidelines and exemptions. Under the proposed revision, a
fund becomes a joint participant in a transaction involving an affiliated
person, and an application is necessary, in situations (1) where either
the affiliated person or the fund holds two percent of the outstanding
securities of an issuer and the other holds any securities of that same
issuer; (2) where two percent of the fund's total net assets are in-
vested in a particular issuer and the fund's affiliated person also holds
no SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5128 (Oct. 13, 1967), [1966-1967
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,477.
151
 Id. at 82,949.
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securities of that issuer; or (3) where an affiliated person participates
in a profit-sharing, bonus or other special remuneration plan provided
by the fund.'" The first two of these guidelines are particularly rele-
vant for funds participating in corporate takeovers. The acquisitions
and holdings of all investment companies having the same investment
advisor are to be aggregated to compute the two percent tests.'
The revision also proposed that persons affiliated with investment
companies merely by virtue of the fact that they each hold five percent
of a common portfolio company be exempted from the filing require-
ments.'" Such a person, the SEC concluded, would not ordinarily be
in a position to influence the fund to effect a transaction for his per-
sonal advantage, at the expense of the fund, unless he "occupied some
additional relationship.'"" Also excluded from filing would be two
funds under the same investment advisor, each of which held a sig-
nificant amount of shares in the same issuer. Although such a situation
technically creates a joint transaction, the SEC felt that it was unlikely
to result in participation by one fund on a less advantageous basis than
the other.'" Unfortunately, the revised rule, which seems to clarify
substantially the requirements of section 17(d), has never been adopted
by the Commission.' It is difficult to draw any meaningful conclu-
sions from the failure to adopt.
Among the few section 17(d) cases which have directly involved
mutual fund participants in takeover bids, the leading judicial state-
ments are found in General Time Corp. v. American Investors Fund,
Inc.,'" and related litigation, which resulted from the acquisition by
Talley Industries and American Investors Fund of stock in General
Time Corp., preparatory to Talley's takeover of that company. Be-
cause the litigation was somewhat complicated, a brief explanation of
the facts is necessary.'" In December, 1967, at the instigation of a
New York brokerage firm, Talley became interested in General Time
as a possible acquisition candidate and purchased 24,000 of the out-
standing shares (roughly one percent) at a price of $23-24 per share.
Talley's president then telephoned the president of American Investors
152 Id. at 82,951.
155 Id.
154 Id. at 82,950.
155 Id.
158 There is an apparent inconsistency here between the exemption for funds under
common management and the aggregating of shares owned by such funds for purposes of
the two percent guideline test.
1ST Although not adopted, the rule has never been withdrawn and presumably re-
tains its status as a proposed rule.
168 General Time Corp. v. American Investors Fund, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.
N.Y.), aff'd sub nom. on other grounds (General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc.), 403
F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969); see also SEC v Talley
Indus., Inc., 286 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd with directions, 399 F.2d 396 (2d Cir.
1968), final decree of permanent injunction entered (unreported), aff'd 407 F.2d 65 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
152 See 399 F.2d at 398-99; SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 122, at 2807.
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Fund (which held nine percent of Talley's voting shares), informed
him that Talley had bought stock in a possible merger candidate, and
inquired as to whether the fund might also wish to buy some shares
to assist Talley in acquiring a decisive interest.
The fund's legal counsel advised that it could purchase some
shares if it maintained complete independence in acquiring the stock
and made no promises or arrangements as to voting, disposition or
otherwise. The fund indicated its interest and Talley revealed the
identity of the target. The fund subsequently purchased 210,000 shares
(just under ten percent) of General Time at an average price of $28.49
per share. All purchases were made through Talley's broker in order
to avoid competitive bidding for the same shares. Talley continued
purchasing for its own account at prices as high as $42.50, and tele-
phoned American Investors a number of times to report how many
shares had been acquired by parties friendly to Talley, including the
fund. After General Time had rejected Talley's proposal for a volun-
tary merger, a plan was formulated to effect the takeover by ousting
the incumbent General Time directors through a proxy fight. General
Time reached an agreement with Seeburg Corp. regarding a defensive
merger, but this plan was abandoned when American Investors and
another fund holding General Time stock announced their opposition
and their intention to vote against such a merger. By this time, the
litigation had begun.
General Time brought suit against Talley and American Investors
in the District Court for the Southern District of New York,'" alleging
that they were "affiliated persons" engaged in a "joint enterprise or
arrangement" to take over control of General Time, without prior ap-
proval of the SEC and thus in violation of Section 17(d) of the Invest-
ment Company Act and Rule 17d-1.'" Speaking for the court, Judge
Bryan concluded that General Time lacked standing to complain of
the violation in question since Congress intended the Investment Com-
pany Act to protect stockholders of investment companies and not
corporations whose securities might be acquired by such investment
companies.'" Although on appeal the decision was affirmed on other
grounds,10 ' the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in a later case ex-
pressed its concurrence with Judge Bryan's determination.'" This
holding is significant in the takeover context because the decision that
the target corporation lacks standing removes the possibility of suing
under section 17(d) from the target's arsenal of defensive maneuvers.'"
no 283 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
161
 Id. at 401.
102 Id. at 402.
100 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968).
164
 In 407 F.2d at 71, the court referred to judge Bryan's opinion, stating: "While
on the appeal from that judgment we did not decide that question . . . we believe the
district court's view was sound—indeed, we now think our decision would better have
been placed upon that ground."
160 While at first glance this appears to conflict with the decisions granting standing
to the target company where violations of the Williams Act are alleged, this may be ex-
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Of course, the target may still attempt to convince the SEC that a viola-
tion has occurred, but control of any subsequent legal action is out of
the target's hands. In the instant case, General Time was successful in
persuading the SEC to take action.
Even before General Time's appeal had been heard, the SEC
filed suit againSt Talley and American InVestors for the same violations
previously alleged by General Time.'" Prior to the suit in SEC v. Tal-
ley Industries, Inc. and just prior to the solicitation of proxies for the
General Time annual meeting, Talley, joined by the fund, filed a
belated application with the SEC requesting approval of the arrange-
ment between Talley and the fund, or alternatively, a declaration that
Rule 17d-1 was not applicable. The SEC found that a joint enterprise
had already been carried out, and that there was "no warrant for
granting retroactive approval to the transactions effected in such viola-
tion of the Act."'" Nonetheless, Talley proceeded with its plans, win-
ning control of the General Time board at the annual meeting; the
margin of victory was attributed to the votes cast by the fund. 189 In
its suit, the SEC asked the court to compel both Talley and the fund to
withdraw the votes cast by them at the annual meeting.
Although the court found Talley and the fund to be "affiliated
persons" within the meaning of the Act by reason of the fund's owner-
ship of nine percent of Talley's stock, it nevertheless dismissed the
suit. The court held that neither the fund nor its affiliated person had
violated section 17(d). American Investors could not possibly be in
violation, stated the court, since the section only prohibits activities
of the affiliated person and does not restrict the activities of the fund
itself.109 In respect to the affiliated person, the court held that no viola-
tion by Talley had occurred. Rule 17d-1 only regulates enterprises or
arrangements in which the fund and its affiliate share or jointly partici-
pate in the profits. Since the fund had "no financial interest of any sort
in the shares of [General] Time bought by Talley nor any agreement,
understanding or commitment of any sort ever to have any such in-
terest,"170
 the section had not been violated. Finally, the court observed
that there was no conceivable manner by which the fund could be af-
fected financially by Talley's purchase of the shares."'
plained by the fact that the Williams Act is intended to protect all investors while the
Investment Company Act is intended to protect investment company shareholders, or those
seeking to become such shareholders.
160 286 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
167 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5358 (Apr. 19, 1968).
108
 SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 122, at 2810.
160 286 F. Supp. at 58.
170 Id.
171 Id. Note, however, that the market price of General Time's stock had risen
from the $28.49 average paid by the fund to $39.00 on the day of the district court
decision, Wall Street Journal, June 24, 1968, at 26, col. 3, plainly due in no small part
to the purchases made by Talley and the underlying purpose of the purchases. Of course,
it was upon this expectation that the fund had bought the shares initially.
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On appeal,'" the Second Circuit found substantial evidence to
support the SEC contention that section 17(d) had been violated, and
reversed the district court's order dismissing the complaint. The court,
finding the crucial issue to be the scope of the phrase joint or joint and
several participant,'" ruled that the district court had construed the
language too narrowly. Section 17(d), said the court, must have been
intended to reach situations not already covered by section 12(a),
which prohibits funds from participating on a joint or joint and several
basis in any securities trading account.'"
Judge Friendly indicated that the court will not upset a regulatory
agency's interpretation of a statutory term where such interpretation
is reasonable, nor will it upset an agency's factual determination where
there is substantial evidence to support it.'" The SEC need only find
some element of combination in order to establish a joint enterprise
within the meaning of the section. When an investment company and
an affiliated person engage in a plan to achieve together a substantial
stock interest in another company, it is clearly reasonable to hold this
to be a transaction in which the investment company is a joint partici-
pant. In the instant case, the fund's purchase, on Talley's recommenda-
tion, and the subsequent expenditure by Talley of over $8,800,000 in
making further acquisitions at prices exceeding 150 percent of that
paid by the fund, did not, under normal industry practice, leave the
fund completely free to act with respect to its own shares."° The court
noted that, although existing evidence indicated that no participation
by the fund on a basis different from or less advantageous than that of
Talley had yet occurred, the objective of a court of equity must be to
insure that it does not happen in the future. Accordingly, the case was
remanded to the district court for formulation of an injunction which
would ensure that there could be no future participation by the fund
on a basis different from, or less advantageous than, that of Talley.'"
On remand, the district court entered an appropriate decree in-
tended to ensure that Talley obtained no advantages not shared by the
fund in any
 future transactions arising from their joint participation.'"
172
 399 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1968).
173
 The court held that the term "transaction" as used in § 17(d) was not limited to
purchases or sales, but was a nontechnical term meaning, simply, "to prosecute negotia-
tions; to carry on business; to have dealings . . . ." Id. at 402 (citing Webster's New
International Dictionary, 2d ed. at 2688).
174 Id. The section referred to is found at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(a) (1970).
175 399 F.2d at 403-04.
176 Id. at 404.
177 Id. at 405-06.
178 The decree provided that as long as Talley was affiliated with the fund, they
could engage in no joint transactions without SEC approval. Talley was prohibited from
selling any General Time shares on the New York Stock Exchange without giving 3 days
advance notice to the fund. If the fund desired to sell, Talley was required to wait 10 days
unless the fund completed its,sales sooner. Talley could sell its General Time shares only
on the New York Stock Exchange or through a merger, tender offer or other arrange-
ment equally available to the fund, or in another manner approved by the SEC and the
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General Time appealed from the final decree,' but the Second Circuit
affirmed, holding that section 17(d) "does not aim to prevent an affiliate
and an investment company from jointly acquiring control of another
company simpticiter; it seeks only to prevent their doing this on a
basis wherein the investment company fares worse than the affiliate," 80
regardless of the possible financial damage to shareholders of the target
company.
While the holding of the case may be limited to situations involv-
ing a joint plan to acquire securities for the purpose of effecting a
change in management control, the case appears to stand for the
broader proposition than any collective action by a mutual fund and
an affiliated person regarding securities may constitute a transaction
requiring SEC approval. Such approval, the court suggested, must be
freely given as long as measures have been taken by the participants
to ensure that the benefits accruing to the fund as a result of its partici-
pation in the transaction are at least equal to those of its affiliated
person.
Particularly significant for a mutual fund involved in a takeover
bid is the disclosure that would result from the necessary submission
of its plan for SEC approval. Even a plan previously judged adequate
with regard to a similar transaction would also have to be approved as
a matter of course. Thus, while section 17(d) does not make joint action
by a fund and an affiliated person unlawful, it does prevent such action
from being effected surreptitiously. The effect of disclosure would be to
provide advance warning to the target of a forthcoming takeover at-
tempt, permitting it time to prepare its defenses.
Interestingly, although the Second Circuit found that Talley's
failure to seek Commission approval constituted a violation, the litiga-
tion in the Talley case left Talley in control of General Time and sub-
sequently the two companies were merged 181 The court made clear,
however, that it found no justification for the drastic relief urged by the
SEC—i.e., withdrawal by Talley and the fund of the votes cast at the
annual meeting, and an injunction against further voting. That remedy
would likely force Talley to liquidate its position in General Time,
which might well be detrimental to the very shareholders of the fund
which section 17(d) was meant to protect.'" While the court could
have found that shares purchased by Talley without prior approval
were illegally acquired and that therefore they must be divested, it did
not so find. It is submitted, however, that this approach does not in-
district court. Talley was permitted, however, to nominate General Time directors and
solicit proxies for their election, or for a merger or consolidation, provided it did not
communicate with the fund regarding these matters. 407 F.2d at 68.
179 407 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1968).
180 Id. at 71.
181 Institutional Investor Study Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2810 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SEC Institu-
tional Investor Study].
182 399 F.2d at 405.
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dicate a propensity on the part of the Second Circuit to overlook the
violation of the filing requirement and examine whether the abuses
which it was designed to prevent had, in fact, occurred. This a fund
cannot avoid filing and escape liability simply by entering into a joint
enterprise under an agreement similar to the final decree entered in
Talley. Nor does the court's approach represent a continuing reluctance
to force an offending affiliate to dispose of his shares simply because of
the potentially damaging affect on the fund. Rather, the failure to im-
pose sanctions on the offender appears to represent the court's conces-
sion to the defendant in view of the underdeveloped state of the law.
As the Second Circuit noted: "Section 17(d) has been rarely construed
. . . [and] .. . • [n]o [previously] decided case ha[s] ever applied
§ 17(d) to a situation like that here."'
Given the judicial precedent of the Talky case, a future defendant
may be expected to know what section 17(a) requires, and failure to
file properly for SEC approval will invite a forced disposition under a
court injunction leaving the affiliate liable to suit by the fund or its
shareholders for any injury suffered as a result of the disposition. In
such a situation, the fund could face tremendous pressure to place the
affiliate's block of shares with another institutional investor, or to pur-
chase the block itself to avoid the depressing effect that a forced sale
would have on the stock price.
It is not yet clear what sanctions should be imposed in situations
where no securities have been purchased and only a voting agreement
is involved. Additional cases, or further proposed revisions of the SEC
rule will be necessary before the permissible bounds of the mutual fund-
affiliate relationship, in the context of corporate takeovers, is clarified.
In the meantime, it is suggested that the simplest means for partici-
pants in a takeover bid to avoid the problems here depicted is to take
steps to ensure that those with whom they participate do not meet the
definition of an affiliated person, which is clearly set forth in Section
2(a) (3) of the Investment Company Act.
D. Disclosure Under the Williams Act
The final, and perhaps thorniest, problem arising from the rela-
tionship between a takeover offeror and a participating mutual fund
involves the public disclosures which such a relationship may necessitate.
Of course, purchase by a fund of shares in any company sufficient to
activate the disclosure provisions of the Exchange Act would necessitate
appropriate disclosure by the fund regardless of any relationships with
others. If, for example, a mutual fund participating in a takeover bid
purchased ten percent of any class of the target's securities, it would
be required to file the various "insider" reports detailed under section
16(a) 184 and also to file under section 13 (d). However, even when
1" Id. at 405-06.
184 Section 16(a) provides:
Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than
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partkipating in a takeover bid, an individual fund 'would not likely
seek to acquire as much as ten percent of any portfolio company. This
is particularly true in view of the discussion' above, -regarding the 're-
quirements imposed by the Investment Company Act on diversified
funds, and the stated policies of these funds.'" The typical offeror
seeking institutional investor assistance is aware of these limitations
and is more likely to seek a smaller commitment from a number of
institutions rather than relying upon the assistance of a single fund.
Nevertheless, a fund's relationships with an offeror and others may
require disclosure of its interest in cases where it has not itself pur-
chased the shares necessary to trigger the statutory reporting require-
ments. The purpose of this section is to consider the circumstances
giving rise to such a result and the consequences resulting therefrom.
The passage, in July, 1968, of the Williams Act Amendments to
Sections 13 and 14 of the Exchange Act was intended to place new
controls on corporate takeover bids.'" Section 13 (d) (1), added by
the Williams Act, provides, in part, that:
Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the
beneficial ownership of any equity security . . . is directly
or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 [now 5]
per centum of such class shall, within ten days after such ac-
quisition [file certain specified information with the SEC,
the issuer, and each exchange where the security is tra.ded]." 7
10 per centum of any class of equity security [registered under the Act] shall
file . . . within ten days after he becomes such beneficial owner . . . a statement
with the Commission . . . of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer
of which he is the beneficial owner.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970). Thereafter, such person must report any change in his
beneficial ownership within ten days after the end of each calendar month during which
a change occurs. Id.
185 See text at pp. 1118-26 supra.
180
 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (e), and 78n(d)-(f) (Supp. V, 1970), as amended 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (e), and 78n(d)-(f) (1970).
187
 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. V, 1970). In addition to certain specified informa-
tion, the section provides for the filing of "such additional information, as the Commission
may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary and appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors." Id.
The information required to be filed by § 13(d) and by 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 to 4
(1971) includes the following:
(1) the name and address of the issuer and the title of the class of securities
involved;
(2) the identity and background of the filer, including his name, business and
home address, present occupation and employer, employment record for the
previous ten years, and any criminal record;
(3) the source and amount of funds used to make the purchase;
(4) the purpose behind the purchase and, if the purpose is to acquire control,
a description of any plans the purchaser has to liquidate, merge or sell the assets
of the issuer, or to make any other major changes in its business or corporate
structure;
(5) the number of shares of the security beneficially owned and transactions
effected in them within the previous sixty days;
(6)' the details of any contracts, arrangements or understandings with any person
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Because the legislation is concerned primarily with significant changes
in corporate ownership indicating a potential change in control, exemp-
tion from the filing requirements is provided in section 13 (d) (6) (B)
for acquisitions by persons whose total acquisitions within the previous
twelve months, when added to the present acquisition, do not exceed
two percent of the class of securities acquired. 188 In addition, the SEC
may exempt or permit the filing of an abbreviated statement by persons
the Commission determines acquired the securities in question for in-
vestment purposes and not for the purpose of, or having the effect of,
changing or influencing the control of the issuer.'" Section 14(d)
requires that the information specified in section 13 (d) (1) be filed by
any person making a tender offer for shares sufficient to give him bene-
ficial ownership of more than ten percent of all such shares outstand-
ing.1°° In 1970, sections 13 (d) and 14(d) were amended, reducing the
level of. beneficial ownership requiring disclosure from ten percent to
five percent.'"
The important issue in regard to the Williams Act reporting re-
quirements is whether the funds' traditional methods of participation
are within the ambit of these requirements and, if so, whether the
methods can be altered to avoid this result. It is submitted that the
resolution of this issue depends to a large extent on the interpretation
placed upon the statutory language regarding , group formation and
acquisition of beneficial ownership.'"
To date, only two cases have dealt substantially with these issues:
Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot,'" and GAF Corp. v. Milstein.'" While
both these cases discuss the events giving rise to the reporting require-
ment, encompassing elements of both group formation and acquisition,
Bath emphasizes group formation and does not deal directly with the
problem of defining an acquisition; Milstein, on the other hand, deals
with respect to the securities of the issuer;
(7) where a tender offer is involved, the names of all persons employed to make
solicitations or recommendations to security holders; and
(8) copies of all solicitations or advertising materials to be used in connection
with a tender offer.
100 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (6) (5) (1970).
189 15 U.S.C. 1}§ 78m(d)(5), 78m(d)(6)(D) (1970).
100 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1970).
181 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d),'78n(d) (Supp. V. 1970), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d),
78n(d) (1970), The reduction appears to have been prompted by a large number of
instances in which just under 10% of an issuer's securities were acquired prior to a
tender offer in order to avoid the reporting requirements. See S. Rep. No. 1125, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970). Since the cases discussed herein were brought while the 10%
limit was still in effect, the significance of the holdings in these cases will be discussed with
reference to the 10% fig-tire. All other references are to the statute as amended.
102 This formulation of the issues was suggested In Comment, "Acquisitions" and
"Groups" Under Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 13 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 149 (1971).
103 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'g 305 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Wis. 1969), rehearing
denied (July 17, 1970).
104 [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 4 93,300 (2d Cir,), aff'g in part, rev'g in part,
324 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
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primarily with the acquisition concept and never directly confronts
the definition of a group. These decisions vividly illustrate the ambigu-
ities inherent in the statutory language.
The disclosure requirements of section 13 are directed at persons
who are beneficial owners of the requisite shares. Beneficial ownership
has been broadly defined by the SEC in its administration of section
16. In a release restating and clarifying the term as it relates to secur-
ities held by family members, the SEC maintained that a person may
be regarded as the beneficial owner of securities held in the name of
another, if by reason of any contract, understanding, relationship,
agreement or other arrangement, he obtains benefits substantially equiv-
alent to those of ownership.'" Such benefits include use of the income
derived from the securities, and the ability to exercise a controlling
influence over the purchase, sale or voting of the securities.'" Thus in
a family context, a person is presumed to be the beneficial owner of
securities held by members of the family living under the same roof.
The concept of beneficial ownership embodied in the Williams Act
is significantly broader than the section 16 definition. Sections 13(d)
(3) and 14(d) (2) provide:
When two or more persons act as a partnership, limited
partnership, syndicate, or other group for the purpose of
acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer, such
syndicate or group shall be deemed a "person" for the pur-
poses of this subsection.'"
Thus, in the case of such joint ventures, the securities owned by each
group member will be aggregated to determine whether the group is
the beneficial owner of sufficient shares to trigger the reporting require-
ments of section 13 (d) (1). The House Report on the Williams Act
explains:
This provision [section 13(d) (3)] would prevent a group of
persons who seek to pool their voting or other interests in the
securities of an issuer from evading the provisions of the stat-
ute because no one individual owns more than 10 [now 5]
percent of the securities. .. . This provision is designed to ob-
tain full disclosure of the identity of any person or group ob-
taining the benefits of ownership of securities by reason of
any contract, understanding, relationship, agreement or other
arrangement.'° 8
1" SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7793 (Jan. 19, 1966), 2 CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. 26,030 and If 26,031.
198 Id.
197 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (1970).
198 H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1968) (emphasis added). Although
the value of certain portions of the legislative history contained in this report have been
hotly debated, 13 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. supra note 192, at 164, there is little doubt
that the legislature intended to accomplish the result described in the excerpt quoted
above. A previous proposal by the SEC to include persons acting as a group for the
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Thus, if a mutual fund becomes a member of such a group and the
group is subsequently required to file under section 13 (d) (1), the fund
will be required to provide information for Schedule 13D regardless of
the size of its individual holdings. Note B to Schedule 13D clearly
states that when the schedule is filed by a group, the required informa-
tion must be supplied for each member and, if the member is a cor-
poration, for each officer, director or controlling stockholder of that
corporation.'" In addition, amendments to the statement must be filed
whenever any material change occurs in the facts disclosed 2 06
If it is assumed arguendo that the existence of a group whose
members beneficially own an aggregate of five percent of a corporation's
stock has been established, the • critical question becomes whether the
formation of the group is an acquisition of beneficial ownership suf-
ficient to activate the disclosure requirement. This question was first
raised in Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot.m The case involved a contest
for control of Bath. Blot, a substantial stockholder and a director of
Bath, desired to replace the chief executive officer and move the offices
of Bath from Milwaukee, Wisconsin to New York City. Madison Fund,
Inc., a closed-end investment company, was also named as a de-
fendant."'
The trial court found that Edward Merkle, as President of Madi-
son Fund, Blot and two other defendants "undertook a deliberate,
conscious plan to pool their voting interests in Bath stock and to acquire
additional shares of Bath stock, and to obtain the support and votes
of other large shareholders of Bath, all to the end that they could force
the resignation of [the president] or force the Directors of Bath to
elect a new chief executive offiCer of their choosing and move the of-
fices of Bath to New York City.” 203
 Although none of the individuals
who were part of the alleged group owned ten percent of the outstand-
ing shares of Bath, the sum of their individual interests approximated
fifty percent. The court discussed at length the formation of the group
and concluded that the group had violated section 13 (d) by failing to
file Schedule 13D within ten days after the group had agreed to act
purpose of acquiring, holding, disposing or voting securities in the definition of "person"
contained in Section 3(a) (9) of the Exchange Act was not adopted. SEC Exchange Act
Release No. 6435 (Dec. 12, 1960), [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
76,730; SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6487 (Mar. 9, 1961), [1957-1961
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. Q 76,752. In the Williams Act this language was
specifically included. In addition, Senator Williams, the sponsor of the legislation, stated
that the purpose of § 13(d)(3) is "to successfully close the loophole that now exists
which allows a syndicate, where no member owns more than 10 percent, to escape the
reporting requirements of the . . . Act." 113 Cong. Rec. 856 (1967).
199 17 C.F.R. § 240,13d-101 Note B (1971).
200 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(2) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2 (1971).
201 305 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Wis. 1969), aff'd, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970), rehearing
dented (July 17, 1970).
202 305 F. Supp, at 530. Although Merkle and Madison Fund were both dismissed
by stipulation in the trial court, 427 F.2d at 103, the case remains as an important guide
to mutual fund conduct under the Williams Act provisions.
203 Id. at 531.
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together .204
 An injunction was granted enjoining the defendants from
any further accumulation of Bath stock, or carrying out the plan to
acquire control, until the court determined that the filing requirements
had been properly met. 2"
On appea1,2" the defendants contended that the statute was not
meant to reach concerted action by existing stockholders agreeing to act
together but not purchasing additional shares. The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit agreed in part with the defendants' contention, but
affirmed the district court's decision after clarifying the necessary ele-
ments giving rise to a filing requirement. Informal discussions among
existing shareholders concerning inadequate management performance,
or even agreements to take over management control, are not report-
able events, stated the court, even if the shareholders involved hold ten
percent or more of a corporation's stock. However, once shareholders
possessing the requisite interest "agree to act in concert to acquire ad-
ditional shares, [disclosure is requiredj."2"
In the court's opinion, the formation of the Blot group for the
purpose of acquiring additional shares was itself a reportable event.
Since none of the defendants individually owned ten percent of Bath's
stock, the court implicitly held that, at the time of the group's forma-
tion, the group, as,a separate entity or "person," had acquired a bene-
ficial interest in the securities held by its members; this acquisition
by the group triggered the disclosure requirements of section 13(d) (I).
While the decision in Bath implied that group formation was an
acquisition of beneficial ownership reportable under section 13 (d),
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in GAF Corp. v. Milstein 208 di-
rectly confronted the issue and reached the same result. Milstein in-
volved an attempt by minority stockholders, all members of the same
family, to gain control of GAF. Although the defendants held a total
of 10.25 percent of GAF convertible preferred stock, none of them
individually owned ten percent, nor had purchased any preferred stock
since section 13 (d) became effective on July 29, 1968. The District
Court for the Southern District of New York, per Pollack, J., inter-
preted section 13 (d) more narrowly than the Seventh Circuit had,
reasoning that no resort to the legislative history was necessary since
"the specific statutory language is clear and compels the construction
that the reportable event is the acquisition of the requisite amount - of
shares and not.the mere formation of a group with a view to control." 2"
GAF argued that a constructive conveyance of the shares from the
'individual to the group occurs when .the group is formed, and con-
stitutes the acquisition of beneficial ownership necessary to bring the
204
 Id. at 538.
2o5 Id. at 539.
200 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970).
207 Id.
208 324 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, [Current] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. Ir 93,300 (2d Cir. 1971).
200 324 F. Supp. 1062, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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group under the filing requirements of section 13 (d). 2" The court, how-
ever, rejected this argument and all other theories of group acquisition
of beneficial ownership in the securities held by group members:
There is simply no statutory authority for saying that .. .
a group must report when it makes no purchases at all.
Nowhere does the statute say that the formation of a
group with a view to gaining control but without making any
purchases of securities, triggers the filing requirement. That
result cannot be achieved by attributing ownership of the
members to the group, without any other purchase."'
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with these conclu-
sions and reversed the decision of the district court. 212 Taking a broad
view of the acquisition of beneficial ownership in the group context,
the court held that when individuals collectively owning more than ten
percent of a company's securities agree to act in concert, this agree-
ment creates a group under section 13 (d) (3) and triggers the reporting
requirements under section 13 (d) (1). 2' Conceptually, it appears that
the agreement creates the group and the group, at the moment of its
formation, acqUires a beneficial interest in the members' securities by
reason of the agreement. The acquisition of such beneficial ownership
imposes a duty to file under section 13 (d) (1) and no acquisition of
shares or agreement to acquire additional shares is necessary.
court argued that such an interpretation was necessary in order to ef-
fectuate the legislative purpose behind full disclosure of "potential
changes in control resulting from a new aggregation of stockhold-
ings."215 The formation of a group whose members together own over
ten percent of an outstanding class of an issuer's securities certainly
poses as great a threat to the corporate structure as an individual who
purchases the identical amount in one transaction. "It can hardly be
questioned," stated the court, "that a group holding sufficient shares
can effect a takeover without purchasing a single additional share of
stock."2 "°
Thus the Milstein decision requires disclosure within ten days of
the formation of a group, as defined in section 13 (d) (3), where the
aggregated holdings of the individual members exceeds five percent. 217
Since initiation of any takeover bid would generally be fruitless unless
the dissident forces controlled substantially more than five percent,
the critical question for a mutual fund considering participation in
210 Id. at 1066.
211 Id. at 1068, Accord, Ozark Airlines, Inc. v. Cox, 326 F. Supp. 1113 (ED. Mo.
1971).
212 [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. if 93,300 (2d Cir. 1971).
213 Id. at 91,654-55.
214 Id. at 91,655.
215 Id. (emphasis in original).
216 Id.
217 See also 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 863, 872 (1971) ; 13 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 168.
219 The
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such a takeover is whether it will be deemed a member of a section
13 (d) (3) group. The SEC recognized this to be the crucial factor,
observing in its Institutional Investor Study, published after the Bath
decision but before Milstein, that:
Institutions frequently hold and manage large amounts of a
company's shares, but do not themselves have beneficial
ownership of such shares. The limitation of disclosure to
beneficial ownership means that the holdings of a complex
of institutions or accounts under common management by a
single financial manager are not aggregated in determining
whether there must be any disclosure, except to the extent
that the complex constitutes a group of persons within the
meaning of Sections 13(d) or 14 (d).218
Under the broad statutory language, two or more persons acting
together for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities
constitute a "group" within the meaning of the section. The district
court in Bath tried to express the definition more simply as a "pooling
of interests" with respect to particular securities. It then found that
the defendants' agreement to vote in concert constituted sucha pooling,
making them a group 218
 The Seventh Circuit took pains to express its
disagreement with this definition. It noted that stockholders must be
permitted the latitude to discuss corporate affairs, evaluate management
performance and band together to influence corporate policy or control
without fear of the arbitrary restraints imposed by disclosure. The
court indicated that only when they agree to acquire additional shares
should their activities come within the purview of the statute, because
it is only then that the abuses which the statute was designed to prevent
may occur.
The court found this interpretation to be consistent with its re-
view of the legislative history of the Williams Act, which indicated that
the overriding purpose of Congress in enacting the legislation was to
protect investors by requiring disclosure when substantial shareholders
or management undertake to acquire shares in a corporation for the
purpose of solidifying their own position in a contest involving corpo-
rate contro1.2" The court noted the evidentiary problems involved in
showing that an agreement to acquire additional shares existed, apart
from the unlikely execution of a formal agreement, but held that when
any agreement was shown, a subsequent purchase by a group member
would give rise to a rebuttable presumption that the purchase "was
made pursuant to an agreement of the , group as of that date to acquire
shares in furtherance of its objectives. 221 By invoking its interpreta-
218
 SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 181, at xxvii (Letter of Transmittal
of March 10, 1971, from the SEC to the Congress) (emphasis added).
218 305 F. Supp. at 537.
220 427 F.2d at 109.
221 Id. at 110. Thus, if the total shares held by the group exceeds 10%, then any
purchase that evidences formation of a group, even if Tess than 2%, will trigger the re-
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tion of the legislative purpose and insisting upon a market purchase
of shares to evidence the agreement, the Seventh Circuit effectively
read the language "holding, or disposing" out of the statute. Such a
result is inconsistent with methods of statutory interpretation estab-
lished by the United States Supreme Court, which has stated that
" [t]here is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of
a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give
expression to its wishes." 2"
The Seventh Circuit's holding that the acquisition had occurred at
the time the group agreed to act together to acquire additional shares,
rather than simply when it agreed to act together, as the district court
held, is particularly significant. It allows an undisclosed major shift
in corporate voting power to occur where previously independent share-
holders pool their shares to form a power block in furtherance of a
common purpose, but make no agreement to acquire nor actually do
acquire additional shares. Thus, where a number of institutional in-
vestors, including mutual funds, participate in a takeover bid, failure
to show that some arrangement existed among them and that, subse-
quent to making that arrangement, purchases were made by at least
one of them, would make proof of a violation of section 13 (d) a practi-
cal impossibility.223
In Milstein, the Second Circuit eliminated Bath's requirement of
a subsequent purchase in assessing group formation. After considering
the legislative history, the court determined that the purpose behind
section 13(d) was to make shareholders and investors generally aware
of potential changes in a corporation's management, by requiring dis-
closure of pertinent information from persons who have acquired a
substantial interest, or have substantially increased their interest, in
a company's securities within a relatively short period of time. 224 In
light of this history, the court concluded that the purpose of section
13 (d) (3) was to prevent a group of persons, collectively owning more
than ten percent of a company's securities and agreeing to act together
with respect to those securities, from avoiding the disclosure require-
ments of the Act merely because no one individual owns ten percent.
From this premise, it follows than an agreement to act together on the
part of individuals collectively owning more than five percent of a
company's securities both creates a group under section 13 (d) (3) and
triggers the reporting requirements under section 13(d) (1).
porting requirements, since upon its creation the group acquired a beneficial interest in
the securities of its members.
222 United States v. Amer. Trucking Ass'n Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940). See also
Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 338, 355 (1941); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products,
Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617-18 (1944) ; and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 420
(1968).
222 Evidence other than a market purchase would be necessary to show that the
agreement contemplated further acquisitions; such evidence would, no doubt, be dif-
ficult to obtain.
224 [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 91,654.
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By eliminating the requirement of a subsequent purchase, the
Second Circuit removed the only specific, ascertainable event which
could serve . as evidence that an agreement, and thus a group, existed.
While the statutory language "holding and disposing" compels this
result, it raises the problem against which the district court warned:
the inherent difficulty of ascertaining if and when an agreement was
entered into and a group formed. The circuit court did not consider
this obstacle insurmountable and noted that a plaintiff would have to
carry its burden of proof by a fair-preponderance of the evidence in
order to prevail on the merits.'"
- Clearly, this burden will not be easily met. In the case of a group
acting. to acquire or dispose of securities, the actual purchase or sale
of those securities by individuals may furnish, as the Bath court sug-
gested, a rebuttable presumption or at least an inference that such
actions were taken pursuant to an agreement. This is particularly true
under circumstances involving the use of the same broker, an exchange
of information about holdings in a target company, or simply where
large block transactions are made at approximately the same time by
persons known to be in frequent communication. Such a presumption
would not be useful, however, where persons making no purchases are
sought to be included in a group where purchases have been made by
others.
The case of the group acting to hold securities is somewhat more
difficult. Both the Bath and -Milstein decisions recognize that stock-
holders must be free to discuss corporate affairs, express concurrence
-with one another on issues of company policy, and vote their shares as
they see fit. .If shareholders are exposed to filing and reporting require-
ments, and possible litigation, merely because of their interaction with
other, shareholders, it will signal the end of the last vestiges of stock-
holder sovereignty.
One further 'problem arises with regard to agreements to hold
securities for the "purpose of voting to effect- a change in - control: if a
shareholder must register as part of a group acting to hold securities
at the time he agrees to vote to effect such a change, is he precluded by
such -filing from changing his mind at a later time? Certainly the vot-
ing rights incident to his ownership afford him the opportunity to
change his allegiance right up to the moment of voting, which obviously
leaves no time to amend his filing. If he does change his vote, share-
holders and other investors who relied on the information in his filing
may. be
 misled. This problem may be particularly significant in a con-
test for control among forces which are each receiving the support of
mutual funds and other institutions.
The 1967 proxy battle for control of MGM is a case in point. At
the time of the contest, fourteen mutual funds and two closed:end
investment companies held 1,423,000..MGM :shares, or more than
225 
.[Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 91,656.
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twenty-five percent of the 5,043,000 shares outstanding. 226 By contrast,
the dissident group, led by an MGM director, controlled directly 13.6
percent of the stock and the twelve director candidates proposed by
management personally controlled only 5.5 percent of the stock.227
The annual stockholders' meeting was preceded by an eleven week
battle, during which both sides sought the votes controlled by the funds.
Six of the funds chose to side with the dissidents, ensuring a close
contest. In the final vote, management prevailed, 2,573,000 to 1,882,000,
a margin of 691,000 votes. 228 Significantly, the Fidelity Group, which
held in its various funds 404,000 MGM shares, or eight percent of the
outstanding MGM stock, decided at the last minute to support the
management slate rather than the dissidents, as they had previously
indicated. If Fidelity had voted on the other side, the dissidents would
have prevailed by 117,000 votes, effecting a change in corporate control.
In a situation such as this, any disclosures made in advance of the vote,
if changeable, would be highly misleading to investors and, if not
changeable, would prevent the free exercise of the fund's voting rights.
There is no apparent solution to this , dilemma.
To date, many other problems under the Williams Act remain un-
solved by the cases. As the Second Circuit noted in Milstein, "the
statute before us is anything but a model of clarity. . . ."2" The deci-
sions are contradictory and confusing, and may be distinguished on any
number of individual facts. They offer no guidelines for the great variety
of ways in which mutual fund participation in takeover bids may occur.
Violations of the law carry criminal sanctions"' and create possible
civil liability as well 2a1 Yet it is virtually impossible in many situations
for a mutual fund, or an individual, to know when one has become a
member of a group or that one is required to - file. The question re-
maining is how a particular mutual fund manager who is mindful of
his legal responsibilities but who, recognizing his duty to his share-
holders, is unwilling to sacrifice potentially profitable investment op-
portunities, can come to a meaningful resolution of the issues in a par-
ticular case.
It is submitted that, inevitably, the answer lies with the SEC. The
Commission must apply its knowledge of the abuses which Congress
220 Louis, The Mutual Funds Have the Votes, Fortune, May, 1967 at 150.
228 Id
227 Wall
Id.
Street Journal, Jan. 18, 1967, at 26, col. 4.
229 [Current] CCH Fed, Sec. L. Rep. at 91,654.
230
 Securities Exchange Act, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (a) (1970).
231 Although the Exchange Act does not expressly provide for private civil remedies,
the courts have consistently implied such remedies from the prohibitions of Sections
17(a), 10(b) and others. See Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)•
Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (both citing cases) ; and Petit v.
American Stock Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The cases indicate that
liability may be imposed upon a party not only for direct injury caused by it, but may
also be imposed when it assists in or has knowledge of improper activities by other
"group" members, or simply by reason of its participation in a group-caused injury.
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had sought to reach, and the problems of an overly broad sweep, to
carve out exemptions and guidelines to accomplish the legislative pur-
pose. Only one proposal has thus far come to light. 232 Its author argues
from the premise that the Williams Act was designed to reveal shifts
in beneficial ownership of securities which may portend a change in
corporate control (and thus the value of a corporation's securities).
The relevant benefits of ownership are those having control implications
—i.e., those which confer the ability to exercise a controlling influence
over the purchase, sale or voting of securities. A number of individuals
would thus be considered a "group" only when the facts of a case indi-
cate that they have obtained incidents of ownership which will enable
them to benefit from those activities that the Williams Act intended
to be disclosed. The specific tests proposed are as follows: A section
13 (d) (3) group is formed (1) for the purpose of holding securities
where its constituents have made a firm commitment and the group
has the ability to determine how the securities are voted, or (2) for
the purpose of acquiring or disposing of securities where the members
of the group have received the benefits of market speculation in secu-
rities.'"
It is submitted that some problems exist with this proposal. One
unanswered question concerns the formality of the agreement necessary
in order to create a firm commitment. Will anything short of an en-
forceable contract suffice? Moreover, when a takeover bid is in the
offing, all shareholders of the target company benefit by the speculative
purchases of group participants to the extent that they share in the
price rise in proportion to their stockholdings. Certainly some sort of
collective action is necessary to find that a group exists and to place
certain individuals in it. On the other hand, it is not yet clear whether
one must actually own securities in order to become part of a group and
thus subject to the filing requirements. Nevertheless, this proposal is
a necessary start which points the SEC in the 'right direction.
E. The Regulated Target and Problems of Control
When a takeover bid involves a target company subject to federal
regulatory statutes other than the securities laws, special problems may
arise for participating mutual funds. The federal laws which regulate
companies engaged in providing transportation, communication or pub-
lic utility services contain provisions that are activated whenever any
person or group acquires, even temporarily, an interest in a regulated
company large enough to represent "control."'" Since, by definition,
a takeover bid involves an attempt to seize control, these provisions are
232 13 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. at 149.
233 Id. at 174. The author justifies the imposition of stricter standards for groups
acting to acquire or dispose of securities than for groups acting to hold on the ground
that the voting of securities is intrinsic to the right of ownership, while the ability to
purchase and sell securities is a "speculative incident of ownership." Id.
234
 The relationship of these statutes to institutional investors was suggested in
Enstam and Kamen, Control and the Institutional Investor, 23 Bus. Lawyer 289 (1968).
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relevant to the conduct of the offeror. If the concepts of group action
articulated in the cases arising under the Williams Act 283 are extended
outside the disclosure context, the control provisions of these regulatory
statutes may also be important for mutual fund participants. There is
frequently a time lag between the acquisition of shares by a group of
investors cooperating with an offeror, and the transfer, by tender or
sale, of those shares to the offeror. To the extent that a group is formed
which may be viewed as having acquired voting control over the shares
held or acquired by its members by reason of an agreement to purchase
or vote those securities, the future action of the group may be subject
to the special control provisions of the federal regulatory laws.
If it is assumed that group treatment is possible, the critical ques-
tion for participants in takeover bids centers upon the word "control":
how large an interest may be aggregated before a control position is
achieved? It has been generally recognized since long before 1933 that
practical control of a corporation does not require ownership of fifty-one
percent of its voting securities—or anything near that amount sae The
term control is used in both the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, but it is defined in neither. Under each statute,
the SEC has issued regulations which define control in almost identical
terms:
The term "control" (including the terms "controlling",
"controlled by" and "under common control with") means
the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or
cause the direction of the management and policies of a per-
son, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by
contract, or otherwise.'
The standard here is somewhat flexible, and depends upon the par-
ticular characteristics of the company involved and the circumstances
of each case 288
The definition of control included in the Investment Company Act
is somewhat broader:
"Control" means the power to exercise a controlling in-
fluence over the management or policies of a company, unless
such power is solely the result of an official position with such
company.289
Although the Public Utility Holding Company Act, Civil Aeronautics
Act and Interstate Commerce Act each contain their own definitions
235 See text at pp. 1153-60 supra.
286 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 770 (1961 ed.).
287 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(f) (1971) (1933 Act) ; 17 C.F.R. § 240.12h-2(f) (1971) (1934
Act).
238 Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1939).
289 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (9) (1970). "Controlling influence" has been held to be
something less than "control." H.M. Byliesby & Co., 6 S.E.C. 639, 651 (1940). See also
Koppers United Co. v. SEC, 138 F.2d 577, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
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of control, 24° the SEC has found decisiOns under one act with respect
to questions of control useful in cases brought under other statutes,
and deserving of "substantial weight."'
Most of the SEC control cases which have gone to court have
arisen under the Holding Company Act. 242 The emphasis in those cases
has been on "controlling influence" which the SEC and the courts have
stated means something less in the way of influence over management
and policies than control, and that latent power" or susceptibility to
domination244
 is sufficient to establish a "controlling influence." The
figure most frequently emerging as a measure of control appears to be
ten percent" but, as has been noted, this figure may vary with the
circumstances of a particular case. Control, of course, exists wholly
apart from the fact whether or not it is exercised, and in most of the
statutes cited above, it is the acquisition of a controlling interest that
constitutes a violation.
Where control or a controlling influence has been established, the
specific provisions of the federal statute under which a target is regu-
lated become relevant. The Federal Communications Act prohibits any
person who directly or indirectly controls a person engaged in a tele-
phone or telegraph business, or a radio transmitting, receiving or equip-
ment company, from acquiring control of any other such person where
there may be anticompetitive effects.' In addition, an FCC rule effec-
tively prohibits mutual funds from owning in excess of three percent of
more than seven television stations of which five are VHF stations. 24 T
Examples of problems created by this rule for funds participating in
takeover bids are indeed available.
In 1966, Banque de Paris des Pays-Bas made a tender offer for
shares of Columbia Pictures Corp. The bank was seeking only twenty
percent of the 1,970,000 shares outstanding, but it received over
680,000, or about thirty-five percent. The executive vice president of
the bank, who was a director of Madison Fund, arranged for Madison
240 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a) (7) (A) (1970) (Public Utility Holding Company Act); 49
U.S.C. § 1383 (1970) (Civil Aeronautics Act); and 49 U.S.C. -§ 1(3)(b) (1970) (Inter-
state Commerce Act).
241 The M.A. Hanna Co., 10 S.E.C. 581, 589 n.13 (1941); The Chicago Corp., 28
S.E.C. 463, 468 n.8 (1948).
242 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 774 (1961 ed.).
248 Koppers United Co. v. SEC, 183 F.2d 577, 580-81 (D.C. Cir. 1943), and cases
cited therein.
244 American Gas & Electric Co. v. SEC, 134 F.2d 633, 643 n.22 (D.C. Cir.) (citing
cases), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 763 (1943).
245 See Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds, H.R.
Rep. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 399 (1962).
240 47 U.S.C. § 314 (1970).
247 47 C.F.R. § 73.636(a)(2) and. Notes 4 & 5 (1971) state that no license will be
granted to any applicant 1% or more of whose stock is owned by a shareholder having
a direct or indirect interest in more than 7 television stations of which more than 5 are
VHF. If the shareholder is an investment company, the relevant percentage of ownership
is 3%. Holdings of investment companies under common management are aggregated for
purposes of determining the percentage of ownership.
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to take 100,000 of the surplus shares. Dreyfus Fund took an additional
190,000 of the surplus shares. When the two funds later pooled their
votes with the bank, and with other individuals holding 350,000 shares,
in an effort to gain a majority of the seats on the Columbia board,
Columbia sued. It challenged the right of the funds to own Columbia
stock based on the FCC rule cited above. Dreyfus and Madison each
held in their portfolios more than one percent of Metromedia, which
owned four VHF stations, prior to buying the shares of Columbia,
which also owned four VHF stations. Madison also owned more than
one percent of Wometco, which owned three VHF stations.
The suit was settled and the arguments were never heard in court,
but the lessons for mutual funds are clear: (1) the fund's inventory of
broadcasting stocks must be checked prior to the making of any pur-
chase of broadcasting company securities, whether in the context of a
takeover bid or not; violation of the rule could result in a forced divesti-
ture of the shares held by the fund, at unfavorable market prices; (2)
the holdings of the offeror must also be checked by a fund before partic-
ipating in a takeover involving a target engaged in broadcasting or
owning voting securities of a broadcasting company; the offeror's in-
ability to complete his intended offer because of a statutory control
provision or similar administrative regulation may leave the fund with
an investment which is fundamentally unsound, apart from the prospect
of a takeover bid.
The Public Utility Holding Company Act prohibits any person from
purchasing securities in a public utility if he does or will thereafter own
or control five percent of the voting stock of such utility plus five per-
cent of the voting stock of another public utility, or of a public utility
holding company. In addition, a company itself becoines a public utility
holding company if it owns or controls ten percent of the voting securi-
ties of a public utility or ten percent of the voting securities of another
company that owns or controls ten percent of the voting securities of a
public utility.248 If a mutual fund were classified as a holding company,
having unconsciously achieved that status as a result of its participation
in a control contest, it would be subjected to SEC holding company
regulations. Since public utility holding companies may not issue any
securities, or acquire securities in other companies without SEC ap-
prova1,24° the fund again might be forced to divest its interest in the
utility, at depressed prices. The Civil Aeronautics Act prohibits the
acquisition of control over any air carrier, a common carrier, or a com-
pany engaged in another phase of aeronatics. 2" Therefore, before pur-
chasing shares of any target subject to this Act, a fund should check on
its holdings of airlines and other companies engaged in aeronautics.
The Interstate Commerce Act makes it unlawful, except by ap-
proval of the ICC "to accomplish or effectuate, or to participate in
248 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a)(7)(A) (1970).
249 15 U.S.C. §§ 79f(a), 791(a)(1) (1970).
sap 49.U.S.C. § 1 378 (a)(5), (6) (1970).
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accomplishing or effectuating, the control or management in a common
interest of any two or more carriers, however such result is attained,
whether directly or indirectly, by use of common directors, officers, or
stockholders, a holding or investment company or companies, a voting
trust or trusts, or in any other manner whatsoever."'" The statute's
definition of a carrier is broad, including common carriers, private
carriers and companies that do no carrying at ail."' Once again, care
must be exercised when a fund participates in a takeover bid involving
a company subject to this act, in order to avoid the same problems
which could arise under the acts described above. Problems could also
arise under the antitrust laws if a fund had a controlling interest in two
competing companies,2" or had a director in common with a competitor
of a company in which the fund held a controlling interest. 2"
Where a mutual fund purchases securities of regulated companies
purely for investment purposes, it is unlikely that any question under
the statutory provisions discussed herein would be raised. However,
where a fund acquires shares of such a company, or agrees to vote
shares already owned, in the context of a takeover bid, a different situa-
tion is presented. There appear to be no reported decisions on this
point. It is submitted, however, that an unwilling target company
determined to resist a takeover bid might seize upon the opportunity
to litigate the issues involved. Such a case might turn on the technicali-
ties of the statutory language or upon the court's judgment of the effect
of the takeover on the public interest. Here, a decision against the of-
feror enjoining his offer might be as detrimental to the fund as an ad-
verse decision in a direct suit. By reducing the marketability of the
shares and their investment potential, an adverse decision would
predictably result in heavy investment losses for the fund.
III. TAKEOVER BIDS AND MUTUAL FUNDS: A
VALUE JUDGMENT
In order to determine the trimmer in which mutual funds should be
permitted to exercise their power in influencing contested transfers of
corporate control, or whether fund participation should be permitted at
all, the economic and social value of such contests must first be assessed.
Available empirical data bearing on this determination is inconclusive.
In a study of all cash tender and exchange offers made in the period
251
 49 U.S.C. 5(4) (1970) (emphasis added).
252 49 U.S.C. 4(3) (1970). Included in the definition are railroads, pipe line com-
panies, express companies, sleeping car companies, motor carriers, and water carriers.
"Motor carrier" includes all companies carrying passengers or property in interstate
commerce by motor vehicle, whether on a contract basis or as a common carrier. 49
U.S.C. {I§ 303(a)(14), (I5) (1970). "Water carrier" includes common and contract
carriers moving persons or goods by water in interstate or foreign commerce, or anyone
who furnishes a vessel for compensation, under a lease, charter, or other arrangement,
to a noncarrier to be used to transport his own property. 49 U.S.C. f$ 902(c)-(e) (1970).
258 15 U.S.C.	 18 (1970) (Clayton Act).
254 United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 165 F. Supp. 356, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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from 1956 to 1967, researchers concluded that it is "impossible to state
that tender offers lead to corporate reform of previously unprofitable
and vulnerable firms."' On the other hand, there is no empirical sup-
port for the view that takeover bids represent attempts by disreputable
persons to obtain control of established companies for the purpose of
"milking" them, liquidating them or using their assets for further ac-
quisitions." It is suggested that the purpose of most takeovers is to
enable a company seeking rapid growth or diversification to expand
where it can no longer do so internally.
If it is assumed that there exists a relationship between manage-
ment efficiency and skill and corporate earnings that is reflected in the
market price of a company's stock, a corporation which is poorly
managed will tend to be underpriced in relation to its potential value.
A control contest may result in a better allocation of economic resources
by giving new management a chance to improve the target's per-
formance record, or where attack is successfully resisted, by sparking
corporate reform. Incumbent management does not, by reason of its
incumbency, have a monopoly on the ability to run its business; more-
over, there is no basis for assuming that the company would not per-
form as well or better under different management.
Perhaps in recognition of the inconclusiveness of the data as to
the value of corporate takeovers, Congress passed the Williams Act as a
means of protecting investors when a takeover was in the offing but,
significantly, took a neutral position with regard to the control contest
itself.'" In view of this congressional mandate, a difficult question is
raised as to whether the legal framework surrounding takeover bids
should differentiate between financial institutions, particularly mutual
funds, and other investor/shareholders in recognition of the practical
and economic differences in their respective abilities to influence such
contests.
A number of theories concerning the manner in which funds should
exercise their power in takeover contests have been advanced and
vehemently supported. The three principal theories may be briefly sum-
marized as follows:
(1) The power of mutual funds arises from the cumulative
investments of small investors, and a duty therefore arises to
use this power to advance the interests of all small investors.
Mutual funds should exert an influence on the management of
255
 Austin and Fishman, The Tender Takeover, 4 Mergers & Acquisitions, no. 3 at
4, 23 (1969). The study was based upon such data as the rate of return and dividend
payout ratios of target companies before and after a takeover bid. See also Hayes and
Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 Harv. Bus. Rev., no. 2 at 135 (1967).
256 See What Further Changes Are Needed?, 25 Bus. Lawyer 871, 873 (1969-70).
257 "[E]xtreme care [was taken] . . . to balance the scales equally to protect the
legitimate interests of the corporation, management, and shareholders without unduly
impeding cash takeover bids. Every effort has been made to avoid tipping the balance of
regulatory burden in favor of management or .. . the offeror." 113 Cong. Rec. 856
(1969) (remarks of Senator Williams).
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their portfolio companies or others consistent with this duty.
When it has knowledge of a takeover bid, a fund should give
portfolio company shareholders and other small investors the
benefit of the fund's sophisticated analysis through the
mechanism of full disclosure. A fund must not be allowed to
use its superior knowledge or financial power to benefit at the
expense of the small investor."' This position, in its essence,
espouses 'a theory of stockholder representative democracy
supplanting or augmenting representation by elected directors.
(2) Since the fund manager is not the true owner of the port-
folio securities and only holds the voting power fortuitously,
funds should be deprived of all voting rights."' This theory is
directed more toward proxy contests than to tender offers,
but represents an interesting variance from theory number
(1).
(3) A fund's primary (and perhaps sole) obligation is to its
own shareholders. When it learns of a potentially profitable
situation where, by exercising its influence, it could realize
substantial gains for its shareholders, it has a duty to do so.
There is no duty on the fund to consider the desirability of a
transfer of control from the standpoint of the business and the
structure of the companies involved."'
The SEC subscribes to the first of these theories. In 1940, when
the Investment Company Act was under consideration for the first time,
the SEC articulated its position as follows:
Investment companies may serve the useful role of representa-
tives of the great number of inarticulate and ineffective
individual investors in industrial corporations in which invest-
ment companies are also interested. Throughout the course of
the existence of such industrial corporations, various problems
are presented to their stockholders which require a degree of
knowledge of financial and management practices not pos-
sessed by the average stockholder. Investment companies by
virtue of their research facilities and specialized personnel are
not only in a position to adequately appraise these situations
but also have the financial means to make their support or
opposition effective. These investment companies can perform
the function of sophisticated investors, disassociated from
the management of their portfolio companies. They can ap-
praise the activities of the management critically and expertly,
258 Baum and Stiles, The Silent Partners: Institutional Investors and Corporate
Control (1965).
259 Louis, supra note 226, at 150.
260 Id.
261 Securities and Exchange Commission, Public Policy Implications of Investment
Company Growth, H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 310 (1966).
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and in that manner not only serve their own interests but the
interest of the other public stockholders."'
The Investment Company Act which emerged imposed no restric-
tions on the capacity of investment companies to control the enterprises
in which they invest. As late as 1966, the SEC indicated that it was not
its intention, nor that of Congress, to restrict investment by mutual
funds in their portfolio companies. 202 In fact, no regulatory measure
prior to 1968 specifically contemplated the facilitation or discourage-
ment of corporate takeover bids, or the permissible role of mutual funds
in such bids. However, the actions of mutual funds in a substantial
number of contested takeovers in which they participated in the late
sixties indicated that they did not necessarily subscribe to the SEC
theory, and invited congressional re-examination. The result was the
Williams Act Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act, enacted in
1968, and later amended in 1970. 2"
As originally conceived, the Williams Act was designed to protect
established companies from corporate "raiders"; 204 however, when
enacted, the Act was framed as a means of protecting individual in-
vestors from being overreached by others who are aware of impending
or potential changes in management control." The device chosen to
accomplish this objective was that which is relied upon throughout the
securities laws—full disclosure; in this case, disclosure of significant
shifts in corporate ownership, or impending tender offers was required.
It is submitted that this approach has, done more to further the purpose
of the Williams bill as originally introduced—i.e., the protection of
incumbent corporate management, than to protect the uninformed in-
vestor. While the philosophical underpinning of the legislation may have
changed, the substance of it remained substantially the same and may
be relied upon to produce the results originally sought.
A consideration of the investors involved in a takeover bid and
the protection provided them by the Williams Act supports the above
argument. In a takeover contest, involving mutual fund participants,
there are basically three kinds of investors involved—target company
shareholders, offeror shareholders and mutual fund shareholders. Each
of these shareholders has little concern for his corporation as a
business entity. He is primarily concerned with the price of the stock
262 Id. at 307.
263 See notes 186 & 191 supra.
ze4 "In recent years we have seen proud old companies reduced to corporate shells
after white-collar pirates have seized control with funds from sources . . . unknown in
many cases, then sold or traded away the best assets, later to split up the loot among
themselves." 111 Cong. Rec. 28,257 (1965) (remarks of Senator Williams). Other scholars
of legislative history have noted that there is some evidence that the purpose of the Wil-
liams Act, at least as originally contemplated, was not as stated—to provide additional
protection for investors—but to provide protection for management. Hearings on S. 510
Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 37-38 (1967) (statement of Professor Stanley Kaplan).
265 113 Cong. Rec. 855 (1967).
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and the dividends paid. He has no interest in management except to
the extent that it can increase the value of his shares at a satisfactory
rate. The shareholders of the offeror may only be injured financially if
the company sustains heavy losses due to expenditures for an unsuccess-
ful takeover bid, or if a successful takeover proves to be ill-advised.
Full disclosure offers them no protection in either case and may con-
tribute to their injury by making defeat more likely.
As for the target company shareholder, the maneuvering of each
side in a control contest may leave him somewhat confused. Unless he
is an unusually sophisticated investor, he is neither in a position to
assess the relative merit of the offeror management as against incum-
bent management, nor to estimate the probability of a successful bid,
access to the information filed in Schedule 13D notwithstanding. His
actions would more likely hinder than help the group he favored. That
is, if he believed a takeover would greatly improve corporate perfor-
mance, he would retain his shares to profit by the enhanced value he
expected new management to create, thus making it more difficult for
the offeror to gain the requisite shares to achieve control; if he preferred
the present management and were uncertain about the future under the
offeror, his fear of a takeover might prompt him to terminate his owner-
ship by selling or tendering his shares, thus increasing the likelihood
of a successful tender.'"
Since takeover bids are usually made at a ten to twenty percent
premium over the current price, to insure acquisition of a controlling
interest, the target company stockholder is almost always able to divest
his ownership at a premium. When institutions such as mutual funds
enter the market to purchase target shares, he may benefit from a
further increase in price. In fact, the best protection the target share-
holder has is reliance upon the natural market forces, and transactions
by sophisticated investors, to value his securities at a price that ade-
quately reflects the likelihood and effect of a takeover bid. To the
extent that federal securities laws and SEC rules provide management
with an early warning system (Rule 13d-1), prevent offeror purchases
outside the tender offer (Rule 10b-13), or otherwise discourage take-
over bids by diminishing their chances for success, shareholders are de-
prived of this opportunity to realize natural market appreciation in the
value of their shares. In short, the fortunes of the target company
shareholder who sells his shares to a mutual fund that is accumulating
stock for later tender to an unknown offeror ought not to be compared
with the position of that investor if he had full knowledge of the im-
pending takeover bid, but rather with his position if such a takeover
bid was effectively prevented by federal regulation.
As far as mutual fund shareholders are concerned, the net asset
value of their shares is likely to increase by reason of any cash profit
realized by the fund upon tender of the target shares to the offeror, or
266 Hamilton, Some Reflections on Cash Tender Offer Legislation, 15 N.Y.L.F. 269,
295-96 (1969).
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their sale in the open market; any resulting loss is merely incident to the
risk the shareholder assumed in selecting a particular fund and placing
his faith in the judgment of its adviser."' The only protection required
here is a mechanism that will prevent fund managers from securing
personal benefits in control contests at the expense of the fund. Dis-
closure of purchases by the takeover group is not particularly helpful
in this regard. Rather, the fiduciary duty of the fund manager might be
supplemented by a rule directed specifically to his actions in takeover
contests, possibly carrying criminal sanctions.
The regulatory provisions regarding control contests presently in
effect are, in fact, most valuable to the management of potential take-
over targets. The advance warning of a forthcoming tender bid provided
by a filing under section 13 (d) affords the time needed to plan and
execute the defensive maneuvers necessary to a successful resistance"
Public disclosure of the specific information contained in a completed
Schedule 13D permits management to pressure the sources of the
opposition's funds to withdraw financial assistance, identify group
participants and probe for weaknesses in the alliance in order to divide
it, and publicly attack the plans of the new group for the target while
revealing no plans of its own 289 The motivating factor in formulating a
defense is most likely to be the self-interest of management, whether or
not it coincides with the interests of target company shareholders.
267 Where an exchange offer is involved, the fund may sell its shares for cash just
prior to the expiration of the offer period in order to avoid the risks associated with
holding the offeror's securities following the exchange. Such shares are purchased by
arbitragers who typically purchase target shares while simultaneously selling short
securities of the offeror, subsequently covering the short sale by exercising the exchange
privilege. One authority estimates that 60-90% of shares tendered in a control contest
are tendered by arbitragers. Newsweek, Dec. 16, 1968, at 86.
268 Target company management may arrange for a competing offer from a com-
pany friendly to the target, or otherwise seek to place substantial amounts of its out-
standing stock in friendly hands. The corporate charter and by-laws may be amended
to provide for an expanded board of directors with staggered terms, election by non-
cumulative voting procedures, and an , increase in the percentage of shareholder votes
necessary to approve a merger.
Any action which will raise the market price of the target's stock, such as a com-
peting transfer bid, an increase in the dividends or a stock split, can make a takeover
more expensive for the offeror. Where an exchange offer is made, target company manage-
ment may solicit sales of the offeror's shares to drive the price down, necessitating an
increase in the exchange ratio.
Some targets have gone so far as to enter into contractual restrictions with friendly
creditors which would be activated by a change in management, or acquired another
company in the same business as the offeror to create potential antitrust problems. W.
Carey, Corporate Devices Used to Insulate Management from Attack, 25 Bus. Lawyer
837. See also Institutional Investor Study, Report of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong,, 1st Sess. 2838 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SEC
Institutional Investor Study]. Hearings on S. 336 and S. 3431 Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sem 133 (1970) (in
one example, Boston & Maine R.R. covenanted that a change in management control
would be a default on outstanding bonds; in another, B.F. Goodrich agreed that all bank
loans would mature in the event of a change of management).
209 See note 187 supra.
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In contrast to the foregoing discussion, the SEC appears to be-
lieve that the Williams Act does not .go far enough in regulating institu-
tional investor participation in takeover bids. In its . 1971 Institutional
Investor Study, the SEC concluded that a need existed for additional
regulation to deal with misuse of undisclosed information concerning a
corporate takeover, which the Commission considered to be an area not
properly covered by either the Williams Act or Rule 10b-S. 2" It noted
that any new rules should distinguish between persons who receive in-
formation for a legitimate purpose related to a proposed takeover, and
those who are given a "tip" for some other purpose.271 The SEC did not
suggest what a legitimate purpose might be nor did it indicate whether
facilitation of the takeover by purchase and later tender of target shares
would be legitimately related to the takeover. Nor did the SEC support
its finding with any data on the number of takeovers attempted since
the passage of the amendments to the Williams Act in 1970.
The SEC further indicated that any new rules must also distinguish
between persons who are part of the group attempting the takeover, and
who thus may communicate among themselves and purchase shares
of the target subject . to the requirements of the Williams Act, and those
who are not part of the group but who are given the information for
other purposes.2" If, however, there is a way, for one to receive the in-
formation about a forthcoming takeover, purchase target company
shares, and not become part of a section 13(d) (3) group, the courts
have not yet recognized it 2 78 In its Study, the SEC observed that the
Williams Act requires no disclosure of a takeover bid until after
acquisition of five percent of target company shares, thus recognizing
the fact that a requirement of public disclosure as soon as a takeover
bid is contemplated would be likely to abort the takeover. 274 It is sub-
mitted that under. the developing judicial interpretation of section 13
(d) (3) relating to group action in takeover bids, the five percent trig-
gering level will have the same undesirable effect.
CONCLUSION
The wide scattering of ownership in large U.S. corporations has re-
sulted in the separation of ownership from corporate control. Manage-
ment, owning little or no stock in its company, perpetuates its control
through the use of the proxy machinery. Faced with the almost impos-
sible task of influencing corporate behavior,. most dissatisfied share-
holders do not try to muster support to force a change; they simply
sell their shares. The takeover bid jeopardizes retention of management
control through the proxy system. In an economic sense, the market
for corporate control is perhaps the most important device left for
270 SEC Institutional Investor Study supra note 268, at anrxii.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 See text at pp. 1153-60 supra.
274 SEC Institutional Investor Study, supra note 268, at =H.
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achieving an identity of interests between shareholders and manage-
ment, or at least for making management more responsive to corporate
shareholders.
It is submitted that a reappraisal of the full disclosure philosophy,
particularly with respect to its application in corporate takeover bids, is
long overdue. A law which insures that shareholders may become better
informed does not automatically benefit them. Full disclosure is still
only a means, not an end in itself. Its applicability to corporate takeover
bids should face empirical testing and economic analysis. Political and
judicial intervention into essentially private corporate affairs requires
a stronger foundation than the perpetuation of past practice and pre-
conceived notions of fairness.
PAUL G. ROBERTS
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